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                                        Politics of Islamic Jihad 
 
                                                             Abstract 
 
This thesis argues among other things, that the concept of jihad, which represents a form 
of striving and endeavour- often misinterpreted in the literature as ‘holy war’- is rooted in 
the Qur’anic ideals and interpretations (ijtihad). However it can be extremely variable 
when ‘applied’ to Muslim societies in the course of history. Thus for example, the 
Greater and Lesser Jihads might be subject to a number of different interpretations when 
applied to Muslim societies deriving from (a) historical experiences and/or 
circumstances; (b) theological or philosophical debates; (c) differing religio-political elite 
formations; and (d) strategic assessments of threats and /or dangers to Islam. We 
demonstrate the multifaceted and variable characteristics of jihad through the use of a 
‘Jihadist Wheel’. In the case of modern jihadist organizations, which we examine, 
reference to the Qur’an as a source of ideological guidance and inspiration has some 
times given way to what is referred to in the literature as a ‘strategic’  assessment of the 
realities confronting Islam. Often, as in the case of Iraq, this might lead to excessive 
violence and accusations of Islamic terrorism. 
 
From an analytical standpoint this thesis argues that ‘jihadism’ and ‘terrorism’ are two 
different constructs in terms of motivation and goals. However the variability of the 
vi 
 
jihadist concept when applied by Muslims under varying conflictual circumstances (i.e. 
threats and /or response) can sometimes add to confusion surrounding the meaning of the 
term and of course its identification with ‘holy war’ or ‘terrorism’. 
 
It is hoped that this thesis will at least add some light to the current debate in the literature 
over the anatomy of jihadism, while seeking to provide an analytical framework for the 
identification and application of different forms of jihad based on the Qur’anic exegesis.     
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                             Chapter- One 
                                          Introduction 
          
1.1 Islamic Jihad: What Is It? 
In the contemporary world Islam is often perceived to be aggressive, dangerous, 
assertive and/or expansive.  These characteristics and many more are often subsumed 
under the broad but analytically loose definition of jihadism. But what are the 
dynamics of Islamic jihad and how do they manifest themselves in contemporary 
Islamic societies, especially in the activities of so-called jihadist organisations?   
  
Jihad is an Arabic word (from JAHADA meaning struggle) that has become familiar 
to the people in the West. It is also a buzz word in Islamic and Western societies, and 
plays a vital role in different levels of politics in these societies. There are many 
Islamic fundamentalist or jihadist groups nowadays who define their struggle against 
their adversaries as jihad. Jihad is frequently misinterpreted in the Western media as 
‘Holy War’.  But the original Arabic word jihad means to strive, to exert oneself and 
to struggle. To struggle in the cause of Allah in a religious context may express a 
struggle against one’s evil inclinations or an exertion for the sake of Islam. In the 
Qur’an the word usually means ‘struggle’ against the unbelievers (kafir/ pl. kuffar). 
Sometimes the ‘jihad of the sword’ (jihad as-sayf) is called the ‘Lesser Jihad’, in 
contrast to the generally peaceful form named ‘the Greater Jihad’ (Figure 1, The 
Jihadist Wheel)* [This figure, the jihadist wheel has been developed by advice and 
proper guidance of my supervisor]. But today jihad is often used without any religious 
connotation as it has become more or less equivalent to the English word ‘crusade’. 
PDF Created with deskPDF PDF Writer - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
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                                                     Figure -1  
 
                                                 Jihadist Wheel    
                            See below for an explanation of how it works 
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Explanation: 
How does the Jihadist Wheel work?  It shows, for example, that jihad is an holistic and integrated 
process involving conflict and /or military and spiritual struggle that can with differing political 
situations (i.e. peace, conflict and war) be understood to function in different ways with differing 
behavioural emphases. For example, with the Jihadist Wheel at approximately 11 o’clock it can be seen 
that martyrdom and self-sacrifice are being utilized in a potentially violent/ conflictual situation, 
perhaps similar to the experiences currently confronting Hamas jihadists in Palestine/Israel. But at the 
other end of the diagonal (5 o‘clock) the emphasis is rooted in the rituals associated with spiritual 
awakening and pious endeavour.  It is, of course, theoretically possible for the jihadist committed to 
martyrdom to be also fully committed to spiritual awakening, the ideals of the Greater Jihad, which 
might lead  to the goal of a successful jihadist operation. Indeed these two positions, it might be argued, 
could well interact in different ways in differing environments. For example, in a peaceful environment 
one might expect the hands on   the clock from 1 to 5 to prevail by way of major emphasis. Jihad in this 
context might tend to reflect the values of the Greater Jihad, whereas in conflictual situations such as 
Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, the motivation for jihadist activity might reflect the 
time on the clock between 6 and 11 o’clock, or the ideals of the  Lesser Jihad.]        
_____________________________________________________________________ 
The Qur’an frequently mentions jihad (see the ‘sword verses’ in Appendix -1) and 
fighting against the unbelievers For example, ‘Leave is given to those who fight 
because they were wronged—surely God is able to help them—who were expelled 
from their habitations without right, except that they say “Our lord is God” ’.1 This 
verse revealed not long after the Hijra (Prophet Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca  
to Medina in 622 CE /1AH) is traditionally considered to be the first verse dealing 
with the fighting of the unbelievers. Many verses which exhort  believers to take part 
in the fighting ‘with their goods and lives’ promise the reward of paradise to those 
who are killed through jihad2 and threaten those who do not fight with severe 
punishments in the hereafter3. Lots of other verses deal with practical matters such as 
exemption from military service4, prohibition of fighting during the holy months5 and 
in the holy places6,  the fate of prisoners of war7, safe conduct8 and truce9. However, it 
                                               
1
 The Qur’an, sura, 22:39, (Riyadh: Saheeh International,) 1997. 
2
 Ibid, sura, 3:157-158; 169-172. 
3
 Ibid, sura, 9:81-82; 48:16. 
4
 Ibid, sura, 9:91; 48:17. 
5
 Ibid, sura, 2:217. 
6
 Ibid, sura, 2:191. 
7
 Ibid, sura, 47:4. 
8
 Ibid, sura, 9:6. 
9
 Ibid, sura, 8:61, 
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 4 
is not clear whether the Qur’an allows Muslim to fight the unbelievers only if they 
have they have the capacity, or under all circumstances. Sometimes jihad can be 
interpreted as an individual duty as well (see Figure-2 the Qur’anic pattern of Jihad). 
For example, this might be the case when the caliph (vicegerent or supreme religious 
leader) appoints a certain individual to participate in a raiding expedition and/or when 
someone takes an oath to fight the unbelievers. Moreover, in theory, jihad becomes 
obligatory for all Muslims capable of fighting in a certain region if that region is 
attacked by the enemy. In this case jihad might be seen to be a valid defence response 
to a perceived physical threat to the existence of the community or nation (umma al-
Islamiyya). 
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                                                         Figure-2 
  
        
                  Conceptual Framework of the Qur’anic Pattern of Jihad 
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Jihad ash-Shaitaan: Jihad against Satan. 
Jihad al-Tarbiya: Educational Jihad. 
Jihad al- Kuffar: Jihad against disbeliever. 
Jihad al-Munafiqeen: Jihad against hypocrites. 
Jihad al-Faasiqeen: Jihad against corrupt Muslims. 
Jihad al-bi-L-sayf: Jihad with the sword. 
 
Source: Based on discussion with my supervisor and my research work. 
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The most important function of the doctrine of jihad is that in theory it mobilizes and 
motivates Muslim to take part in wars against unbelievers as this is considered to be 
the fulfilment of a religious duty. Other significant characteristics of jihad are that 
they could be classified by place, issue and purposes. This motivation is strongly fed 
by the idea that those who are killed on the battlefield, called martyrs (shaheed), will 
go directly to paradise10. When wars were fought against unbelievers, religious texts 
would circulates, replete with Qur’anic verses and Hadiths ( reported sayings and 
deeds of the Prophet Muhammad)  extolling the merits of fighting a jihad and vividly 
describing the reward waiting in the hereafter for those slain during the fighting.  
 
Another important function of jihad was to enhance the legitimation of a ruler. After 
the end of the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750) the rift between Shi’ite (lit. the party of 
Ali, the fourth lawful caliph of Islam) and Sunni (the main orthodox group of Islam) 
became more vigilant. The Shi’ite demanded the restoration of the rule of Ali’s family 
(i.e. the caliphate) after his death, and from that demand developed the quest for 
Shi’ite legitimacy; this was followed by the eventual fragmentation of the Islamic 
community at the battle of Karbala (680). An acceptable way to acquire greater 
legitimacy in classical Islam was to wage jihad against unbelievers, and this was one 
of the main tasks of the lawfully appointed caliph. The doctrine of jihad also provided 
a set of rules governing relationships with the unbelieving enemies and behaviour 
during actual warfare, including the range of behavioural options open to the 
appointed ruler at any one time (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). 
 
                                               
10
 Ibid, sura, 3:157-158; 169-172. 
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1.2 Islam: Politics of Religion 
 
 In the post 9/11 period, a strong wave of anti-Islamic sentiment rolled across the 
United States and Western Europe. Islam was characterized as an aggressive and 
belligerent religion. Even more alarmingly, that militancy was on the rise within the 
Islamic world. However, Western, and especially US attitudes towards ‘terrorism’ 
were significantly broadened by 9/11 (September 11, 2001). President George W. 
Bush declared that the war against terrorism encompassed far more than al-Qaeda 
(The Base): it was a war against international terrorism.  
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                                                      Figure-3 
 
                                          Conceptual Framework:  
                                              Jihad and Conflict 
Source: www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm last access, 16/09/2005 
 
Explanation: The concept of jihad is motivated by the religio-political ideas derived from 
the Qur’anic texts which is non-secular by nature. The only goal of jihad is to establish an 
Islamic state. 
Conflict Situation 
Guerilla Warfare 
Purposeful Target 
 
Jihad 
Purposeful Target 
Military Personnel;  
Installations 
Achievement: 
Secular Political Goal 
Military Personnel; 
Installations 
Civilians and Installations 
Achievement: 
Islamic State  
 Sources, for example, include more than 100 different definitions of terrorism, a major characteristic 
of which is the use of violence against innocent third parties for political reasons (see Appendix-3, 
Definition of Terrorism).  It should be noted that the term terrorism is pejorative, normative and highly 
subjective in value. Terrorism primarily relates to many forms of violence directed against [innocent] 
civilian third parties for a multiplicity of reasons, including  political pressure to conform and/or 
submit. As an analytical tool it has obvious limitations, especially when related to concepts such as 
jihadism.  In contrast Islamic jihadism is motivated primarily by Qur’anic religious goals and 
objectives some of which may lead to violence against [innocent] civilians (i.e. Lesser Jihad), while 
others aspects of jihad (i.e. Greater Jihad),  may amount to little more than peaceful religious devotion 
and/or  struggle against the enemies of Satan.     
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Most political commentators, especially in the United States and the West, really do 
not understand the religio-political nuances of Islamic jihadism and wrongly (as per 
President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address, 2001) uncritically equate 
‘terrorism’ and ‘jihadism’ as being organically interrelated. Indeed while both 
concepts might seem to be similar in motivation and end results they are actually 
rooted in vastly different ideological goals and perceptions (see Appendix-3 
Definition of Terrorism). 
 
In his annual State of the Union address, (2001) President Bush stated: ‘Our enemy is 
a radical network of terrorists every government that supports them. Our war on terror 
begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist 
groups global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.’11 Subsequently, the 
United States took action against Islamist organizations such as the al-Qaeda, Taliban, 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah, (see Table -1, Typology of Islamic 
Fundamentalist Organizations) all of whom carried out attacks against the West and 
world-wide Israeli and American interests. 
 
Al-Qaeda makes no secret of its ultimate goal of universal domination in the name of 
Islam, and in this respect it is utterly uncompromising. In particular it sees itself at 
war with all Christians and Jews. Its vision is of a world united under the banner of 
Islam. To achieve the ultimate goal – a universal Islamic community (umma al-
Islamiyya) or Dar al-Islam it is committed to revolutionary jihadism against the so- 
 
                                               
11
 Burton M. Leiser, ‘The Catastrophe of September 11 and its Aftermath’, in Terrorism: The 
Philosophical Issues, ed. Igor Primoratz, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.199. 
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called forces of evil, wherein the US is described as the ‘Great Satan’. As Omar ‘Abd 
ar-Rahman, ‘the blind Egyptian Sheikh’ and member of the radical extremist (takfiri) 
Gamaa al-Islamiyya said after the first World Trade Centre  bombing in New York 
(1993), which he helped to engineer:  
        There is no solution for our problems except jihad for the sake of God….    
        There’s no solution, there’s no treatment, there’s no medicine, there’s no cure   
        except with what was brought by the Islamic method which is jihad for the sake       
        of God…. We welcome being terrorists  …. And the Qur’an makes it, terrorism,  
        among the means to perform jihad for the sake of Allah, which is to terrorize the      
        enemies of God who are enemies, too.12  
 
 In this speech there is an implied linkage between terrorism and the realisation of 
jihadist ideals. Indeed from his perspective it might be argued that jihad legitimises 
the uses of violence in what is perceived to be a just war against the enemies of God.   
Thus for ‘Abd ar-Rahman jihad was more than prayer and fasting, it entailed bullets 
and bombs or the seeds of violence against the perceived forces of oppression (see 
Figures 3 and 4,) 
                                               
12
 Cited in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The age of  Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War 
against America, New York: Random House, 2003, p. 16f. 
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                                                      Figure - 4 
 
                    Conceptual Framework of the Political Pattern of Jihad 
 
 
 
  
 
1) Religious Jihad and Jihad an-nafs: Jihad against one’s self to inner and spiritual 
development. (Greater Jihad) 
 
2) Social Jihad: Jihad al-Da’wa and Jihad al-Tarbiya- Spreading of Islamic values 
and educational jihad. (Greater Jihad) 
 
3) Jihad al-Kuffar: Jihad against the disbeliever. (Lesser Jihad) 
 
4) Jihad al-Munafiqeen: Jihad against hypocrities. (Lesser Jihad) 
 
5) Jihad al-Faasiqeen: Jihad against corrupt Muslim. (Lesser Jihad) 
 
6) Jihad bi-L-Saif: Jihad with the sword. (Lesser Jihad) 
 
7) Jihad ash-Shaitaan: Jihad against the Satan. (Lesser Jihad) [As the United States 
and Israel are the satans]. 
 
Source: Based on my research work. 
Jihad 
 
Religious Jihad Social Jihad  Political Jihad 
Jihad an-nafs Jihad al-tarbiya Jihad al-kuffar 
Jihad al-
munafiqeen 
Jihad al-faasiqeen 
Jihad bi-L-saif 
Jihad ash-shaitaan 
 
 
PDF Created with deskPDF PDF Writer - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
                                                                                                                      Introduction                                                                                                                   
 
 13 
 
Islamic jihadists like Omar ‘Abd ar-Rahman or Osama bin Laden have been 
predicting for years that there would a great apocalypse that would involve the 
slaughter of infidel collaborationist governments and their ignorant masses.  Why do 
they feel threatened?   Maybe they are seeking an ideological pretext for rallying 
Muslims in a universal crusade against their political adversaries, seen in terms of a 
threat to Islam. (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4).  Maybe they believe that pro-US or 
Americanised Muslim governments conspire to deceive and seduce the Muslim world 
and ride the Christian Crusader (salibiyin) horse against Islam. Maybe the apocalyptic 
war will lead to the re-conquest of Rome and all of Europe and America by Islam.13  
 
In his fatwa (advisory legal opinion), ‘Declaration of war against the Americans 
occupying the land of the two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia]’, Osama bin Laden went 
beyond threats against America and Israel to also threaten Arab leaders who 
collaborate with them. The Royal House of Saudi Arabia was singled out for having 
failed to expel the ‘polytheists’ (mushrikun) from its country.14 After 9/11, bin Laden 
explained that the events that transpired that day made it clear that ‘the West in 
general, led by America, bears an unspeakable Crusader grudge against Islam’. He 
described the actions of the hijackers as messages that resounded throughout the 
world, and were leading to mass conversions of infidels to Islam in China, Holland 
and even in America. The plight of the West was just retribution for ‘the tragedy of 
al-Andalus’, the defeat of the Muslims in Spain by Christian armies in 1492, and the  
 
                                               
13
 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary, sura, 46:21-6, 22:1, New 
York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc., 1987. Cited in Benjamin and Simon,  The age of Sacred Terror, 
p.92f.  
14
 Issued on August 23, 1996. Cited in Benjamin and Simon, The age of Sacred Terror, p.142.  
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abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924.15 Thus in theory bin Laden’s war is 
directed against the entire Judeo-Christian world and is an attempt to re-establish the 
caliphate and spread Islam throughout the world. Bin Laden’s campaign recognizes 
no limits on the methods to be employed in bringing about that Islamic world.  
 
The concept of jihad is philosophically related to Islamic religious ideals that are 
rooted in the Qur’an, the Sunna (authoritative example of the way in which Muslims 
should live) and the traditions of classical Islam. These might be said to have 
impacted upon the daily lives of Muslims in both pragmatic and spiritual ways, 
historically and in the present. By virtue of its importance in the lives of Muslims 
jihad might well be regarded as the Sixth Pillar of Islam. Yet in the course of history 
this concept has evolved in keeping with the changing face and declining fortunes of 
states and peoples within the Islamic world.  Even today it continues to ‘metastasise’ 
by virtue of its religio-politico-ideological manipulation by jihadist organisations, 
such as Hamas, the significance of which we will examine in Chapter 4. 
 
From an analytical perspective jihadism is a highly specific ideological concept 
rooted in (a) the Qur’an and the Sunna; (b) historical and pragmatic experiences of 
Muslims, and (c) spiritual commitment of individual Muslims as a normal 
requirement of their faith. However Western and even some Muslim scholars, 
notwithstanding certain ideological biases, tend to see jihadism often uncritically as 
simply an ideology related to the needless pursuit of violence, unrest and uncertainty 
in the lives of Muslim peoples and governments (see literature analysis below).  This 
                                               
15
 Al Jazirah broadcast of Bin Laden’s recorded statement, 27 December 2001. Cited in Benjamin and 
Simon, The age of Sacred Terror, pp. 158ff. 
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often leads to great distortions (especially in the Western media) in which violence 
per se is often equated with terrorism and lurid aspects of Islamic punishments 
(hudud).This is often inadequately described as Islamic ‘fundamentalism’.  However, 
it might be argued that the concept of jihadism is a multifaceted process, religiously 
based in the Qur’an and related to the historical and environmental experiences of 
Muslims since the time of the Prophet Muhammad.  Thus, in theory, jihad might be 
seen to be an extremely variable concept that under certain circumstances might 
oscillate between peace and conflict in the lives of Muslims depending on the historic 
circumstances confronting the Islamic community (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). 
While Qur’anic texts (e.g. the ‘sword verses’) as variously interpreted might provide a 
framework for struggle or action, the nature of the response at any one time might be 
determined more by the type of environment and the perceived threat confronting 
Muslims in the daily lives than a strictly literalist interpretation of Qur’anic texts. 
Even here the variability of the concept when applied might be determined more by 
the nature of the ruling religio-political elites and their experiences in the every day 
life of the people (see Chapter 4).    
  
1.3 Literature Review:  
 
In classical Islam there are two main types of jihad: (a) the Greater Jihad and (b) the 
Lesser Jihad, with an overlapping relationship between them (see Figure-1, the 
Jihadist Wheel). While primarily Western scholars have made valuable contributions 
through research on aspects of international terrorism, the concept of Islamic jihad 
has not been well understood and /or defined in terms of its basic components. 
Sometimes in the case of Western scholars the concept of Islamic jihad has been 
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loosely and uncritically identified with either Islamic terrorism or simply international 
terrorism. The organic relationship between the two, however, remains somewhat 
imprecise other than through the vague notion that violence somehow permeates both 
constructs. In the section below we will briefly examine  the methodologies of a 
selected and limited sample of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars with reference to 
how they perceive, interpret and apply the concept of jihad in their various studies.    
 
1.3.1.a) Theoretical and Philosophical Concept of Jihad: Islamic School of    
Thought 
Among  Muslim scholars we can find huge conceptual differences relating to 
theoretical definitions of jihad.  In his book, Jurisprudence in Muhammad’s 
Biography(1413AH) the Azhar scholar (Cairo)  Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti 
argues that in Islam jihad is basically an ‘offensive’ war, and  does not take into 
consideration whether it is  ‘defensive’. Its only goal is the exaltation of the word of 
Allah’s Kingdom on earth regardless of the means. By this way he clearly advocates 
the offensive type of jihad. Egyptian Muslim and jihadist scholar, Sayyid Qutb 
(d.1966) notes four stages in the development of jihad. In Milestones (1964), he 
argues that each stage will be replaced by the next stage in this order but the fourth 
stage will remain permanent because this will be the final stage of universal caliphate. 
In his other works, Basic Principles of the Islamic World View (Trans.2006), In the 
Shade of the Qur’an (1954), Islam and Universal Peace (1951), The Religion of Islam 
(n.d. after 1954), Social Justice in Islam (1949) and World Peace and Islam (1951) he 
has selected a number of verses from the Qur’an and formulated a theory of offensive 
jihad or violent struggle. He envisages a revolutionary vanguard (taliah) meeting in 
conflict with the forces of the jahiliyya and through the grace of Allah finally 
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achieving a universal caliphate under the sovereignty of Allah. We might observe that 
this is an extreme interpretation of jihad resulting from Qutb’s somewhat paranoid 
view of the world.   
 
 Indian Muslim revivalist Abu’l A la Maududi rejects any distinction between 
offensive and defensive jihad. For him jihad is part of the overall defence of Islam.  
His views are broadly similar to those of Qutb.  Maududi’s vision of jihad had been 
influenced by the colonial problems of India. In his book, Jihad in Islam (1981) he 
argues that jihad has been totally misunderstood because ‘Islam requires the earth- not 
just a portion, but the whole planet’.16 To alter the old tyrannical social system and 
establish a new just order of life by the power of sword is called jihad. His view of 
jihad was shaped by the nature of his environment and by the historical process (i.e. 
partition) of the subcontinent in the 20th century. In his other book Towards 
Understanding Islam (3rd ed. 1998) he also argues that, successful jihad, 
notwithstanding the use of violence against non-Muslims, might lead to the sharia-
type state, which was the goal of successful jihad. In his book Islam and Nationalism 
(1984), Ali M. Naqavi argues, according to the Qur’anic dictates, that Muslims have a 
universal mission, not a national one and jihad is the only way to accomplish that 
mission. Naqavi’s primary arguments promote the role of nationalism in Islam but 
apart from that he advocates an offensive type of jihad.  
 
Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in his 
treatise on jihad, makes literal use of the Qur’an and hadith to support his philosophy 
of establishing a universal caliphate.  For him jihad is ‘obligatory for every Muslim’ 
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 Abul A’la Maududi, Jihad in Islam (Kuwait: IIFSO) 1981, p.6 
PDF Created with deskPDF PDF Writer - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
                                                                                                                      Introduction                                                                                                                   
 
 18 
(farida)17 as it contributes to the growth of Islamic consciousness in society, which is 
a necessary foundation for Islamic government. He also argues that jihad and qital 
(killing) are used interchangeably to mean the use of force. Al-Banna begins his 
treatise by quoting from Qur’anic sura 2:216 (al-Baqara): ‘Fighting is obligatory to 
you, much as you dislike it.’ But he does not cite the tolerant verse from Qura’nic sura 
109: 6 (al-Kafirun) ‘You have your religion and I have mine.’ He concludes, ‘Allah 
has obliged Muslim to fight… to secure the pursuit of al-da’wa (spreading of the 
faith) and thus of peace, while disseminating the great mission which God entrusted to 
them.’18 Ideologically al-Banna favours an activist view of jihad so that any 
derogation from the ideal of maximum struggle might lead to a lower degree of 
religio- political commitment in the interests of Islamic government. Thus like Qutb 
and Maududi political necessities shaped al-Banna’s ideological and philosophical 
perceptions of jihad. 
 
Contemporary Pakistani Muslim scholar Fazlur Rahman in his work, Islam (1979), 
recognizes the extensive presence of jihad in the Qur’an, and rejects the stand of 
modern Muslim apologists such as Rudolph Peters who have tried to explain that 
jihad is purely a defensive term only used by the early Muslims. He emphasizes the 
belief that Islam’s fundamental assumption of world sovereignty must be in the hands 
of the Muslims. Majid Khadduri in his work,   War and Peace in the Law of Islam 
(1969) argues that ‘Jihad is the peak of religion’. After Islam became supreme in 
Arabia it embarked on a ceaseless war of conquest in the name of the faith. 
Furthermore jihad was employed as an instrument for religious conquest and the 
establishment of an imperial world state. However his study fails to analyse the 
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concept of jihad, especially in terms of the nature of the relationship between 
offensive and defensive jihad. For example, do these terms operate independently or 
do they have levels of philosophical and ideological interaction, which might 
determine the nature of religio-political behaviour both of the Islamic state and the 
individual Muslim? 
  
Assaf Moghadam in his article, “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology”19 argues 
that accurately labelling the nature of Salafi-jihadist doctrine as a religious ideology is 
not merely an exercise in academic theorizing, but has important policy implications, 
because confronting Salafi-Jihadists on religious grounds is highly problematic. They  
draw from the same religious sources, albeit selectively and stubbornly, that 
influences the lives and practices of over a billion other Muslims. Assaf argues that a 
closer look at what makes the Salafi Jihad an ideology reveals that a more proper term 
to describe the Salafi Jihad would be a religious ideology. Ideologies have an 
explanatory function whereby they attempt to raise awareness among a certain group 
that a particular problem deserves their attention. Salafi Jihadists attempt to raise 
political awareness of Muslims (especially in Iraq) that their religion is under threat or 
on a wane.  Salafi Jihadists present a programme of action, namely jihad, which is 
understood in military terms. Martyrdom is extolled as the ultimate way in which 
jihad can be waged hence the proliferation of suicide attacks among Salafi Jihadist 
groups.  In  The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the 
Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (2008), he argues that  it should be ‘obvious’ that the 
United States and the West are not facing  Islam per se as their main enemy, but an 
extremist  ideology,   which employs religious rhetoric and symbols to advance their 
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cause. In The Roots of Terrorism (2006) he provides a broad overview of the root 
causes of terrorism but because his main emphasis was on terrorism and he views 
jihad as a religious ideology, thus the nature of jihad and its relationship to ‘terrorism’ 
was not discussed.  
 
1.3.1.b) Application of Jihad: Islamic View 
For more than a decade, militant Islamists have confronted the West but yet the West 
has failed to understand who or what their adversary is. Fawaz A. Gerges in Journey 
of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (2006) examines the ways in which jihadist 
manipulate Qur’anic doctrines and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad for their 
propaganda machine. His other books The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global 
(2005), America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? (1999) 
and The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-
1967, (1994) show why militant Islam has never seemed more relevant given that its 
protagonists have made it abundantly clear that they now have a far more dangerous 
agenda than previously faced. These books help us to see jihad solely in terms of a 
violent response to a specific given situation. But like other theorists Gerges fails to 
perceive jihad as a holistic process, which includes a totality of philosophical and 
ideological responses deriving from the nature of the environment: whether it is 
hostile or friendly; whether Muslims constitute a majority or minority; whether the 
state is responsive or unresponsive to the ideological commitment of the jihadists and 
whether the jihadists gain popular approval for their chosen course of action. Ed 
Husain’s The Islamist (2007) is a protest against political Islam. He explains how 
radical Islam or the concept of jihadism exploits the minds of our young generations. 
Therefore, what makes them receptive? As we have seen, psycho-jihadism seems to 
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be a product of a radical Islamist environment such as Iraq, Palestine or Afghanistan. 
However, through the internet it can quickly spread to less conflict prone regions of 
the world and metastasise into other areas of social, economic or political struggle. 
Faisal Devji argues Al-Qaeda and its jihad are only the most visible manifestations of 
wider changes in the Muslim world. In  Landscapes of the Jihad (2005) he argues that 
jihad assumes its universality primarily through the mass media rather than by local 
traditional schools, lineage or Muslim authority.  
 
1.3.1.c) Jihad: Reformist View 
 Orientalism (1978) by the late Edward Said discusses, among other things, why and 
how we form differing perceptions of Islam, in the context of Middle East societies. 
He argues compellingly that inherent [orientalist] biases and prejudices obscure our 
understanding both of Islam and jihadism and reduce them to meaningless clichés that 
are often perceived to violently threaten the fabric of Western societies. This so-called 
gap of perception distorts rather than enhances our perception and is all too-common 
in terms of the current discourse on Islamic jihadism.  
 
 An example of what neo-Orientalists would call an apologetic approach to jihad is 
Noorani’s book Islam and Jihad: Prejudice versus Reality (2002). Noorani has argued 
that ‘the so-called Islamic fundamentalist is an impostor. He has misused a noble faith 
as a political weapon. Of course, Islam does have a political vision, but it is far 
removed from the Islam which very many Muslims and non-Muslims imagine it to 
be.’20  His argument on jihad is theologically based on the Qura’nic concept of 
Greater Jihad.  His writing reminds us that the majority of Muslims love peace, and 
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that ‘terrorist’ actions shock them no less than us. However, Noorani does not tell us 
why a  Muslim minority wish to ‘immolate’ (i.e. sacrifice or martyrdom) themselves 
by their idea of jihad. He does not argue like other Islamists that self-sacrifice in the 
way of Allah is necessary for the defence of Islam. 
 
 In Why Muslims Rebel (2003) Hafez suggests that the political oppression of 
Muslims has caused their rebellions. But how  jihad plays any role in this process or 
how we can apply the multifaceted nature of jihad was left unanswered. His analysis 
ends in blaming external repressive and exclusionist factors, but if we wish to 
understand why these rebels transform Islam into a political ideology of rebellion, we 
would again be left without an answer.   
 
1.3.2.a) Western Political View of Jihad: Twentieth Century and after 9/11  
 Scholars like Amin Saikal or John L. Esposito observe that the relations between 
West and Islam have grown tense, especially since the infamous 9/11 incident. Saikal 
in his book Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation (2003), argues that because 
of the nature of the problem, US military might is not enough to win over the ‘war on 
terrorism’ as it must be accompanied by a political strategy to address those issues.    
Esposito argues that Islam like Judaism and Christianity rejects ‘terrorism’, 
suggesting that some people (whom we might call jihadists) manipulate Islam as a 
political tool in order to change their society and oppose imperialism. Esposito has 
written short histories of Islam which, however, have remained rather detached from 
the rest of his argument. In What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam (2002), he 
argues that the mainstream Islamic activists believe that the restoration of Muslim 
power and prosperity requires a return to Islam (i.e. the spiritual values that derive 
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from the Qur’an, which were extant in the lives of the companions (sahabah) and 
followers of the Prophet), a political or social revolution to create more Islamically 
oriented states or societies. He argues that some Muslim organizations believe jihad 
will liberate Muslims at home and abroad because jihad is the perceived vehicle for 
the realisation of the Qur’anic ideals of Islam. In  Unholy War: Terror in the Name of 
Islam, (2002) Esposito discusses the nature of Islamic fundamentalism and its 
relationship with the West, which he perceives to be offensive. Esposito also 
discusses the different types of jihad such as Greater Jihad or Lesser Jihad, but the 
linkage between the two in the context of the modern jihadist discourse needs 
refinement.   
 
On the other hand, Beverley Milton-Edwards focuses on the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in relation to the colonial past of Islam. In her books, Islamic 
Fundamentalism: Since 1945 (2005) and Conflicts in the Middle East: Since 1945 
(2001) [with Peter Hinchcliffe] she argues on the effect of colonialism on Islam and 
internal problems of the Islamic world such as secularism, violence, globalisation etc. 
However she is less concerned with an analysis of the anatomy of jihadism than the 
actual impact of jihadism on contemporary Islamic societies, which she identifies with 
violent characteristics of a few extremist organisations and states. 
 
In Understanding Terror Networks (2004) Marc Sageman summarizes the origins and 
evolution of what he calls the global Salafi-jihad. He defines the nature of Salafi-
jihadist terrorist organizations, which he argues are limited to specific jihads seeking 
to liberate specific lands.   Furthermore, the roots of the global jihad are Egyptian, not 
Saudi or Afghani. Sageman concludes that social bonds play a more important role in 
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the emergence of global Salafi jihadism. He argues that one of the most popular 
religious explanations is simply that Muslims have strayed from the righteous path. 
Recapturing the glory and grandeur of the golden age requires a return to the authentic 
faith of the ancient ones, namely the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, the 
Salaf. The revivalist versions of Islam advocating such a return are called Salafi. 
Their strategy is the creation of a pure Islamist state, which would create the 
conditions for the reestablishment of such a community, he argued.  
 
Gabriele Marranci suggests that is why we need to understand how human beings 
form their identities, since a Muslim identity is no more than one of the many 
expressions of human identity. In his book, Jihad Beyond Islam (2006) he also argues 
that jihad is a highly charged word often mistranslated as holy war which has become 
synonymous with terrorism such as the 9/11 incident. Clearly some Western scholars 
have failed to understand the religio-political and historical complexities of jihad. The 
result of this has led to the concept being variously and loosely interpreted in the light 
of ideological and political biases.  Marranci demonstrated that some radical Muslims 
do not uphold jihadist ideals because they are Muslims but rather they feel Muslim 
because of their commitment to jihad. Indeed Muslims do not need to know very 
much about Islam at the theological level to develop their rhetoric of jihad.  In 
Muslims in the West, (1997) and Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam, (2002) Gilles 
Kepel argues that some Muslims living in the West have already developed a 
monolithic and ideological representation of the West and by contrast, a self-
representation of their identity as monolithically Muslim. Therefore it is not surprising 
that the concept of jihad has developed an independent life beyond the classical 
theological Islamic understanding. While the outward characteristics of jihad may 
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entail some form of violence, the philosophical and ideological underpinnings 
associated with the concept as perceived in different environments (i.e. peaceful or 
conflictual) is lacking in this methodology.  
 
In Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (2002)  Rohan Gunaratna sheds light 
on Al Qaeda’s financial infrastructure and how the organisation trains combat soldiers 
and vanguard fighters for multiple guerrillas, terrorist and semi-conventional 
campaigns in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus and the Balkans. He also 
investigates the clandestine Al-Qaeda operational network in the West. But he does 
not examine interesting theoretical questions relating to the development of Islamic 
jihadism within the framework of the nation state. He assumes that modern jihadists 
draw inspiration from the Qur’anic (i.e. ‘sword verses’ – see Appendix-1) which 
motivates their actions to struggle against the forces of darkness (i.e. US and Israel). 
But he does not show any organic links between the two forms of jihad (Greater or 
Lesser) and offers no real explanation how the various categories and oscillations of 
our Jihadist Wheel (see Figure1) might operate within Islamic societies with differing 
levels of secularisation, including political and economic development. For example, 
what might tilt the Jihadist Wheel towards violence and spiritual fulfilment associated 
with the peaceful resolution of conflict.   
 
1.3.2.b) Western Philosophical View of Jihad: Before 9/11 
 In Islam and International Relations (1965) [ Harris Proctor ed.] contributors argued 
that Islam as a religion per se was an ideologically inconsistent factor in terms of the 
international relations of Muslim states, especially during the Cold War when some 
Muslim states were pro-US (Jordan) while others (Egypt for a while and Syria) were 
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pro-USSR. At that time jihad was not studied systematically as a tool of Muslim state 
behaviour in international relations. The contributors probably thought that Islam 
would continue to lessen as a factor in international relations as states became more 
secular in orientation.    
 
 Majid Khadduri in his chapter in Harris Proctor argues that, ‘The Islamic theory of 
international relations is to be found neither in the Qur’an nor in the Prophet 
Muhammad’s utterances, although its basic assumptions were derived from these 
authoritative sources.’21 It was rather the product of Muslim speculation at a time 
when the Islamic Empire had reached its full development. In this context ‘jihad was 
accordingly a form of religious propaganda carried out by spiritual as well as by 
material means’22  
 
 In Muhammad: A Western Attempt to Understand Islam (1992), Karen Armstrong 
attempts to offer a picture of Muhammad which facilitates a profound understanding 
of Islam and the people who adhere to it so strongly. In dealing with Muhammad’s 
war policy against Mecca (c.622-630), she asks how far Islam should be considered a 
religion of the sword. While analysing his major political achievements in uniting the 
tribes of Arabia she explores the reasons why Muslims regard political activity as a 
religious duty. At the same time she asks why Muslims tend to see worldly success as 
a sign of God. This book helps us to understand the religious motivation of jihad. In 
this context Muhammad was seen to be responding to perceived threats to the umma 
al-Islamiyya. Jihad was therefore a process which was adapted to meet the needs of 
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the Islamic community as it evolved to confront the challenges besetting it. However, 
little is said about the modern application of jihadism.     
 
1.3.3) Western View: Jihad as Terrorism 
 In his edited book, The Just War and Jihad: Violence in Judaism, Christianity & 
Islam (2006) R. Joseph Hoffmann argues that religion itself with its conflicting 
images of the gods and their demands are the primary cause of conflict, war and 
violence. He asks if violence is an historical condition affecting all religious 
movements, or are some religions more prone to violence than others. He concludes 
that it is not a clash of civilizations but a conflict of belief systems that is at the heart 
of the present crisis. A conflict between those who believe the world is best 
understood as the work of a divine being who reveals his ‘will’ in sacred writings, and 
those who believe these writings to be products of human imagination.  The book 
adopts a multidisciplinary approach to the subject of religious violence and its root 
causes. The contributors simply see jihad as a worst possible violent form of Islam. In 
The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims (2005) Andrew 
G. Bostom depicts Muslim justification for jihad and its worldwide impact that 
extended over thirteen centuries of war. The intention of his work was  clear from the 
very first page where he poses three different quotations. (1) ‘…Before Mohammed, 
there is blackness, slavery, exploitation. After Mohammed, there is light…but did it? 
(V. S. Naipaul)’23 (2) ‘…there is a profound moral difference between the use of force 
for liberation and the use of force for conquest. (Ronald Reagan)’24 ‘(3)…Is the call 
for jihad …a human rights violation (Dr. John Garang).’25 Bostom also argues that 
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Islam expanded in the eighth or ninth centuries and regarding this expansion, little is 
said about jihad yet it all happened through war. The Legacy of Jihad reveals how 
jihad was waged against non-Muslims and that those who survived those campaigns 
became forced tributaries in lieu of being slain. The organic meaning of jihad was still 
unanswered.  
 
Steven Emerson in his book, American Jihad: The Terrorist Living Among Us (2002) 
argues that the true nature of Islam and the roots of the militant tradition are 
inseparable. With Islam there is no separation of church and state. Because in Islam 
the sacred and the secular are one, the battle of who rules society is far more intense 
and is fought as an all or nothing affair. In addition the word jihad has a special 
meaning every time it is mentioned in the Qur’an. It means fighting only, fighting 
with the sword. This seems to be a somewhat myopic view of the concept, as we will 
argue jihad was a social necessity for the Muslims over the period.  In Inside 
Terrorism (1999) Bruce Hoffman has provided us with an analysis of the essentials of 
international terrorism and its global practice since World War Two. Hoffman’s 
observation of jihad was very loose and uncritical because he put more emphasis on 
the definition of terrorism and its political and ideological linkage. His vision of jihad 
has been mixed up with either Islamic terrorism or simply international terrorism.   In 
contrast our thesis argues that jihadism reflects a critical interaction between offensive 
and defensive forms deriving from Qur’anic interpretation. 
 
 In her study, Louise Richardson investigates What Terrorists Want: Understanding 
The Terrorist Threat (2006) delves into the minds of terrorists and demonstrates that 
they are not crazed criminals but rational, ideological actors willing to exploit their 
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own weaknesses to maximum effect. Her study helps to understand some 
philosophical dilemmas of a terrorist and of a jihadist mind. For example: jihadists are 
often thinking creative individuals (both men and women) whose devotion to Islam 
has been politicised by the nature of the struggle in which they find themselves in 
contemporary society. There is a certain distinction with a non-religious terrorist in 
terms of motivation and, of course, ultimate rewards, which the jihadist naturally 
seeks in paradise. We will examine the implications of this motivation with reference 
to Hamas in chapter 4.   
 
In, The Age of Terrorism (1987), Walter Laqueur discusses the concept of terrorism, 
including a study of national and international violence. He defines terrorism as a 
political tool and provides a systematic global survey of the major terrorist groups, 
their motives and ideologies, modes of operations and aims. This is an interesting 
study that enables us to conceptualise patterns of terrorism and their relationship with 
forms of Islamic jihadism, which he defines as Islamic terrorism. He assumes that all 
Muslims are violent and jihad is simply a pretext for violence. It contains certain 
inherent biases by uncritically identifying Islam with terrorism and the ongoing 
struggle against Israel and the US. In this context all Muslims are potential jihadists. 
To some extent he is technically right in the sense that all Muslims are committed to 
struggle in various ways though mostly peaceful. But the reality is quite different 
because jihad has been used by Muslims over the period for their various needs and 
we will discuss this issue more fully in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
 In International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Control, (1990) editor Charles 
W. Kegley, Jr. argues that there is a common tendency amongst Western scholars to 
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unsophisticatedly equate jihadism with terrorism in general, as if they were different 
sides of the same coin.  However it is our argument that jihadism can be both 
variables in terms of its application and in terms of its objectives which it might seek 
to achieve within the course of history.  Thus if violence does occur it might be 
motivated by religious inclinations and operate within certain clearly defined religious 
parameters. Terrorism is often linked politically to secular nationalist goals and 
objectives. This, it could be argued is the basic philosophical distinction between 
national terrorism and jihadism which a number of authors fail to identify.  
 
Terrorism How the West can Win (1986), edited by Benjamin Netanyahu. This book 
(by a pro-Zionist author – also previous Israel prime minister whose objectivity is 
suspect from the first page) offers a comprehensive, reasoned analysis of terrorism as 
a phenomenon, a startling dissection of the West’s weakness towards terrorism, and a 
practical, sober strategy for meeting terrorism’s challenge. He observes that Islamic 
terrorism and jihadism are part and parcel of the same hostile package directed against 
Israel and the US who are perceived by the author as the paragons of virtue in a sea of 
darkness.  This approach tends to obscure rather than enlighten and explain the 
processes associated with the activities of Islamic jihadism.  
 
 In All The Troubles Terrorism, War and The World After 9/11 (2004), Simon Adams 
discusses global politics and our world of terrorism and war after 9/11. As the one 
remaining world superpower, US foreign policy towards different Muslim countries 
inevitably occupies a central role in this analysis. But discussion about the basic 
philosophy or root causes of jihad was again studiously neglected. The reason is not 
hard to fathom. Most pro-Israeli or pro-US scholars would tend to see terrorism and 
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jihadism as being different sides of the same coin, epitomised by al-Qaeda, Hamas, 
Hezbollah etc.   
 
In Al Qaeda: and What it Means to be Modern (2003) John Gray seriously questions 
the view that the human condition can be remade by science and political engineering. 
He argues that Al Qaeda is a product of modernity and of globalisation and it will not 
be the last group to use the products of the modern world in its own monstrous way. 
This is a good book to examine the anatomy of terrorism in a hi-tech era but it fails to 
draw any basic distinction (i.e. philosophical and political) between terrorism and 
jihadism in modern world politics. Violence, whatever its application, in whatever 
situation is uncritically assumed to have potentially terroristic objectives. And given 
the pejorative nature of terrorism when applied, the linkage to jihadism must 
inevitably lead to the assumption that jihadism is a particularly violent process to be 
denounced. The logic of course requires a good deal of correction which we address 
in this thesis.  
 
The collapse of communism and the rise of militant Islamic movements in the Middle 
East have raised the spectre of a future dominated by a conflict between Islam and the 
West. (e.g. Huntington) In his book Islam & the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and 
Politics in the Middle East (1996), Fred Halliday sets out to reject such 
interpretations. He provides a critical but cautious reassessment through a 
consideration of the sources of Islamic militancy and an analysis of the 
confrontational rhetoric of both Islamic and anti-Muslim demagogues. However 
Halliday fails to provide us with a conceptual framework of jihad and its root causes 
because his study fails to differentiate the philosophical and political differences 
PDF Created with deskPDF PDF Writer - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
                                                                                                                      Introduction                                                                                                                   
 
 32 
between terrorism and jihadism.   In, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (1999) 
Rabbi Firestone discusses the Qur’anic text of jihad with reference to the early period 
of Islam when the landscape of jihad was completely different. However his approach 
to prove the violent nature of jihad was uni-dimensional. 
 
 In his books  Militant Islam Reaches America (2002), or Slave Soldiers and Islam: 
The Genesis of a Military System (1981), and In the Path of God: Islam and Political 
Power (1983) Daniel Pipes tries to focus on militant Islam and its ideological 
definition, and by doing so he also raises some interesting questions. For example: (1) 
Is Islam a threat? (2) Does poverty cause militancy? (3) Do moderate Islamist exist? 
By attempting to find the answers to these questions he observes that, ‘about one in 
every eight Muslims worldwide supports militant Islam. Militant Islam distinguishes 
itself from any other contemporary political movement in the magnitude of its 
ambitions.’ He argues that, terrorism, in other words, is just one dimension of a war 
but militant Islam has many fronts and takes many forms. Violence is an important 
symptom of the problem, not the problem itself. Finally he asserts that the enemy in 
this war is not terrorism but militant Islam. Clearly he fails to differentiate between 
militant Islam and jihadism. Bernard Lewis, in The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and 
Unholy Terror (2003), and What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and 
Modernity in the Middle East (2002) argues that Western inability to understand the 
culture and civilization of the Middle East leads the anger and mistrust for both 
parties. Both of his studies deal with a mainly historical perspective of the Middle 
East problem and provide us with some theoretical components of the concept of 
civilizational clash. Again, his concept of jihad is highly biased by the Western 
thought of Islamic terrorism. In The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
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Order (1996), Samuel P. Huntington provides us with a framework for a future war of 
civilisations between Islam and the West but does not appear to ask the critical 
question about the role of jihad in the unfolding drama. He believes that the 
inevitability of civilisational clash is directly related to the aggressive nature of the 
Western and Islamic civilizations which is rooted in their religious heritages. No 
doubt his theory injects more fuel in jihadism as because Islam believes the constant 
battle between Dar-al Islam and Dar al- Harb.  Huntington seems to believe that one 
of the major axioms of Islam is jihadism, referred to in a totally unsophiscated way as 
militancy along the ‘fault lines’. But he fails to highlight the nuances of the concept as 
might be applied in the context of Islamic history.  Indeed his research in this area 
leads one to question his ability to predict such far reaching conflict. While Islamic 
jihad certainly has offensive and defensive characteristics as our research has shown, 
it would be wrong to assume uniformity of understanding within the Dar al-Islam on 
this issue, far less its application in the form of civilisational war.  
 
Matthew Levitt dissects Hamas’ international support network in his study Hamas: 
Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (2006). He demonstrates that 
the charitable and social components of Hamas are inseparable from what he assumes 
to be its true ‘terrorist’ nature. But as we have argued, depending on circumstances 
jihad might be utilised as a separate social and humanitarian requirement in the lives 
of the Palestinian people.  This form of jihad has been adapted by Muslims 
throughout history to meet differing needs.  In Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the 
Militant Islamic Movement (2007) Zaki Chehab  shows how Hamas developed with 
the implicit encouragement of the Israelis, who wanted to weaken Yasser Arafat’s 
Fatah movement. Like Hizbollah in neighbouring Lebanon, Hamas built a formidable 
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social base in Palestine through its jihadist welfare programmme. He also explains 
why the people of Palestine are receptive to Hamas’ policy of armed struggle 
(including the preparation of martyrs) because jihadism can assume differing images 
which imply a degree of interaction deriving from the process of religious 
commitment.  In our discussion about Hamas (chapter 4) I dispute the fact that he 
fully understands Hamas’ commitment to jihadist process. He does not see jihad as a 
process reflecting the needs of the Palestinian people at any particular time and that 
recourse to violence, while it may be one part of the jihadist response, is related to the 
nature of environmental challenges besetting Hamas rather than the direct by-product 
of its violent interpretation of jihad.          
 
The late twentieth century saw the emergence of Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979; 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979; the occupation of the Grand Mosque in 
Mecca 1979 and 9/11 [2001], the event that shook the world. The roots of 9/11 can be 
traced back to the beginning of the 20th century, being manifested in the rise of 
Islamic [political] fundamentalism from the 1970s. Jihadism might be seen as a 
religio-political ideology closely associated with heightened Islamic re-assertiveness 
in the modern world. Muhammad Ayoob’s (ed.), Politics of Islamic Reassertion 
(1981) was an early   attempt to follow the history and spread of this new political-
religious phenomenon described as Islamic fundamentalism. The activist nature of 
Islamic societies was clearly identified but this was seen to derive from differing 
social, economic and political   experiences confronting Islamic societies. In a sense 
jihad was interpreted as a form of Islamic ‘reassetiveness’ deriving from differing and 
unique historic and pragmatic circumstances confronting Islamic societies. As an 
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applied ideology rooted in Qur’anic ideals, jihad took many and different forms when 
applied politically to diverse situations confronting Muslims.  
 
 The aim of this thesis is to examine theoretically and empirically the concept of 
Islamic jihad as a means of understanding the underlying motivation of Islamic 
militancy and political extremism in the contemporary world. We believe that the 
literature surveyed has not adequately addressed this problem because of its less than 
rigorous interpretation of jihad. The thesis will also attempt to examine, (a) the origins 
of jihad; (b) historical interpretations of jihad; (c) an application of the politics of 
jihad in the modern Islamic state with particular reference to Hamas. 
 
Therefore in our plan of the study, chapter two will examine the theoretical 
framework of jihad, chapter three will deal with origin and historical approach of 
jihad, chapter four will examine our case study of Hamas and chapter five will be 
conclusion.  
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                                                      Chapter –Two 
 
 
                                   Framework for Understanding: 
                              Theoretical Concept of Jihad in Islam 
 
 
 
 
 2.1  Definition and Evolution of Jihad in Islam 
 
 
 As we have seen, the core concept of Islamic belief system is based on patterns of Dar 
al-Islam or realm of Islam and Dar al-Harb or realm of war. Islamic fundamentalism (or 
Islamism) divides the world into realms of absolute good and absolute evil, and claims 
exclusive possession of divine truth. It is the religious obligation of all Muslims to wage 
war, literally, until the whole world has been brought under Islamic rule (Dar al-Islam). 
In theory, they (Islamists) oppose any kind of secularism (based on material science), 
which they perceive to be responsible for the totally unacceptable ideas of pluralism, both 
religious and nonreligious. This chapter examines the meaning and purpose of Jihad in 
Islam.  
 
The word jihad comes from the Arabic verb jahada, which as Lane in his Arabic-English 
Lexicon points out, means ‘He strove, laboured, or toiled; exerted himself or his power or 
efforts or endeavours or ability’1 Jihad, Lane continues ‘properly signifies using or 
exerting, one’s utmost power, efforts, endeavours, or ability, in contending with an object 
of disapprobation, and this of three kinds, namely, a visible enemy, the devil, and one’s 
                                                  
1
 E.W.Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, (Beirut, 1968), Vol.2 p.473 
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self’2. All of which are included in the Qur’an sura (chapter) 22:78.In the course of 
history jihad came to be used somewhat imprecisely by Muslims to emphasize behavioral 
concepts such as  ‘he fought, warred, or waged war, against unbelievers and the like.’3 
 
Some Muslim scholars classify jihad more precisely into different categories such as: 1) 
Jihad-an- nafs  or Jihad against one’s self; 2) Jihad ash- shaitaan or Jihad against Satan; 
3) Jihad al- kuffar or jihad against the unbelievers; 4) Jihad al- munafiqeen or Jihad 
against hypocrites; 5) Jihad al- faasiqeen or Jihad against corrupt Muslims; 6) Jihad al –
tarbiya or educational Jihad; 7) Jihad al- da’wa or spreading of Islamic values; and 8) al-
Jihad bi-as-sayf  or Jihad with the sword (see Figures- 2 and 4). In every language certain 
words may have a number of different meanings depending on their usage. We shall 
examine the meaning of jihad in the context of a) Islamic history, b) Qur’anic and Hadith 
references and c) scholarly interpretations of it.   
 
2.2 Historical Meaning of Jihad 
 
Jihad as Islamic holy war is probably either a Western or ill-informed perception of jihad 
in the course of Islamic history. Practically the concept has varied with differing 
historical epochs (i.e. no consistency) depending on the strength and commitment of 
Muslim empires, states and latterly jihadist organizations (e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon at 
the moment etc).  Thus there has been no consistency in terms of the application of the 
concept (i.e. Lesser Jihad) in the course of Islamic  history.  
                                                  
2
 Ibid. 
3
 The Qur’an, (Riyadh: Saheeh International,1997), p.464 
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 Theoretically, Jihad means wars against non-Muslims (Dar al-Harb) since Muslims are 
forbidden to fight each other.4 Of course it may also apply to hypocrites who could be 
Islamic. (E.g. today Osama bin Laden and the view that Saudi Arabia equates to 
Americanized Islam i.e. hypocrites). Early Islamic civilization spread in the Arabian 
Peninsula by a series of battles and was primarily offensive in nature. As many as 78 
historic battles were fought by the Prophet Muhammad himself, and only one (the Battle 
of the Ditch) battle was a truly ‘defensive’ war5. By implication the rest were simply 
‘offensive’ by nature. For example, Muslim soldiers in Syria, Spain, North and Western 
Africa, Persia, Egypt and India (c.8th century) became part of a victorious religious 
crusade committed to the spread of Islam through peaceful struggle and more frequently 
military conquest6. Thus defensive and offensive interaction with subject peoples became 
an integral part of the    process of conquest or jihad. Islam also spread peacefully 
through conversion of subject peoples. Indeed there was an underlying process which 
included the continuing interaction of both the Greater and Lesser Jihads.  Jihadism 
therefore might be said to have represented a process of religious conquest by the sword 
(saif) as well as through prayer (salat) and spiritual commitment (see Figure -1 the 
Jihadist Wheel). The interaction of these differing emphases of the faith was often 
dependent upon (a) the capacity of the Islamic community and (b) the response of the 
subject peoples to the imposition of the Dar al-Islam. 
 
                                                  
4
 Ibid, p.117 (sura 4:92-93). 
5
 Daniel Pipes, Militant Islam Reaches America, (New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003) p. 
264. Also in Syed Kamran Mirza, “An Exegesis on ‘Jihad in Islam,’” News from Bangladesh, 19 June, 
2002. 
6
 Daniel Pipes, Ibid. 
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Thus in the early days of Islam, Muslims initiated a series of offensive wars against Arab 
pagans, Jews and Christians to spread and impose Islam by ‘force’ (but only if they 
resisted) and to seize the resources of these lands. After the Prophet Muhammad built up  
his forces in Medina (c.622-32), the tradition evolved of sending an invitation to various 
Arab tribes to enforce the authority of the umma al-Islamiyya (Islamic community). 
Pagans were invited to accept Islam, with war being waged against those who refused. A 
typical invitation to the ‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-kitab) (i.e. Jews and Christian) was: 
‘Embrace Islam, or pay the poll-tax (jizya), or fight to death.’ Undoubtedly, the concept 
of an offensive war to spread the faith of Islam was a genuine Islamic concept: Jihad for 
the sake of God. The Prophet Muhammad was seriously injured in one of those wars he 
so relentlessly fought. Muhammad finally overcame the Quraysh, the ruling tribe in 
Mecca as a result of (a) superior military power (b) diplomatic skills and (c) spiritual (or 
ideological) commitment of his followers reflected in their pilgrimage (hajj) to the city in 
629 and the prophet’s religio-political occupation the following year.  It might be argued 
that in the mind of the prophet there was a clear interaction between the offensive and 
peaceful aspects of jihad, the application of which was dependent upon the response of 
the enemy or perhaps the subject people (see Figure -1 the Jihadist Wheel)  
   
2.3  Jihad: References from the Qur’an  
And you did not kill them (qatiluna), but it was Allah who killed them…(Q 8:17). 
Jihad was mentioned most frequently in the Qur’an as meaning ‘warfare’, often coupled 
with ‘fisabil Allah’ (in the way of Allah).  While the Prophet Muhammad resided in 
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Mecca (c.610-622), he did not have many supporters and was not as powerful as the Arab 
pagan tribes. It was then that Muhammad received a series of revelations or Meccan suras  
(chapters) (610-22) which are contained in the Qur’an. (These tend to avoid direct 
mention of jihad in the sense of outward military struggle against superior forces of the 
Quraysh while the emphasis on spiritual or ideological commitment of his followers was 
crucial by way of membership recruitment during this period.)   In contrast, in Medina 
(c.622-32) following the Hijra  (flight from Mecca), Muhammad quickly assumed 
religious and political power and leadership over the highly divisive and diverse (i.e. 
Jews and pagans) local community. It was at that time he received revelations (i.e. 
Medinan suras) which incited his followers (muhajirun) to organize and fight internally 
and externally in the name of Allah. In the Qur’an there are a number of verses (ayats) 
which sanction fighting against non-Muslim infidels under particular circumstances. Let 
us examine and analyze some of these so-called ‘sword verses’ with reference to jihad 
which are relevant to this thesis. In the Qur’an there are 18 suras (chapters) with 100 
verses (see Appendix 1) which directly describe the motives, objectives and goals of 
jihad.  
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        Table-2.1: Sanctions for Jihad in the Qur’an  
Target Groups Type-1 Offensive Type-2 Defensive Type-3 
Reactionary/Provocative 
Killing 
Polytheists  
9:5-7, 12-16; 9:8;  
Unbelievers 66:9; 5:41,51,54; 8:55,57,58; 59:2-7; 
Hypocrites  9:68,73; 66:9; 5:41,51,54;  
Bedouins  8:39;  49:14; 
Meccan Quraysh 8:39; 57:10; 8:33; 8:33; 8:41; 48:22-24; 
Believers 
(duties of) 
 2:191; 2:193; 2:194; 
2:216; 2:244; 3:167-
68; 4:71-77; 4:84; 
4:104; 8:12,15-17 
8:50; 8:65; 
9:29,36,44,123; 22:39-
40; 33:23; 47:4-7; 
48:25; 61:4,11; 
4:95; 5:35; 8:45-46; 
8:74-75; 9:20,24; 
9:38-41,44; 22:78; 
29:6, 69; 49:15; 60:1-
2; 61:11; 
 2:193; 2:194; 2:216; 2:217; 
3:141; 3:157; 3:158; 3:169; 
3:171; 3:195; 8:60-63; 8:65; 
9:80-83, 88,89, 111, 120-22; 
16:101; 22:58-59; 47:35; 
48:10; 57:25; 61:10,12,13,14; 
100:1-5; 
Source: Based on the Qur’an and developed by my research work. 
 
What does this Table 1 show? The majority of Qur’anic texts clearly identify jihad in 
terms of a series of conflictual relationships – offensive and defensive -   between 
believers (umma al-Islamiyya) and unbelievers (kuffar) as the Islamic way of establishing 
the Kingdom of Allah on earth (Dar al-Islam). Likewise, from the Hadith and the earliest 
biographies of Prophet Muhammad (c. 8th century), the early Muslim caliphate (e.g. 
Umayyad, 661-750)) may have understood these Qur’anic texts to be interpreted as a 
form of struggle (jihad) to set up the Dar al-Islam. This would have been doubly 
confirmed as a result of successful conquest in the early centuries of the Islamic era. 
Historically, therefore, from the time of Prophet Muhammad onwards, jihad as physical 
warfare in support of the message of Islam has been an evolving reality for the Muslim 
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community. Hence, it comes as no surprise in the contemporary Islamic world  when 
jihadist appeals to Islam’s glorious [military] past to justify their commitment to jihad. 
 
2.4  Jihad: References from the Hadiths 
 
Qur’anic ayats (verses) and numerous Sahi Hadiths7 of some kind were instrumental for 
Muslims to dedicate their strength and mind to the cause of Islam. ‘Fighting for the cause 
of Allah’ (jihad) was sanctioned widely in the Sahi Hadiths. Almost one-third of the 
fourth volume of Sahi Bukhari Sharif, Islam’s principal collection of Hadith, focused on 
jihad as physical war. There are thousands of Sahi Hadiths that simply talk about jihad— 
war in Islam (see Appendix 2). We will examine some of these in this chapter. 
       
 Table-2.2: Prescriptions of Jihad by the Hadiths     
Hadiths Jihad as Warfare Jihad for Self 
Development 
Rewards  
Sahi Bukhari Sharif Vol.4, Book-52, No. 42,44,46, 48, 
50, 53, 54, 61, 63; 
Vol.4, Book-52, 
No.46; 
Vol.4, Book- 52, 
No.35, 46, 48, 49, 
53, 63, 64; 
Mishkat al-Masabih Vol. 1:807;  Vol. 1:807; 
Sahih Muslim:Book-
198 
No. 
4292,4293,4294,4311,43219,4366;10 
  
Malik’s 
Muwatta:Book-2111 
No. 21:1.1, 21:1.2, 21:1.4; 
21:14.27,28-33; 
  
Hadith 
Encyclopedia12 
1-20;  1-20; 
Source: Based on the above Hadith literature and developed by my research work. 
                                                  
7
 Sahi Bukhari Sharif, Sahih Muslim. 
8
 http://www.iiu.edu.my/deed/hadith/muslim/019_smt.html Last access 14/09/2007 
9
 The Prophet Muhammad’s comments on killing women and children. 
10
 The Prophet Muhammad said, “I will expel the Jews and Christian from the Arabian Peninsula and will 
not leave any but Muslim. 
11
 http://www.iiu.edu.my/deed/hadith/malik/021_mmt.html Last access 14/09/2007 
12
 http://www.islamonline.net Last access 14/09/2007 
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How might we interpret Table 2.2?  Clearly it seems to support a relatively high level of 
military conflict or fighting (qitl) as an elemental part of jihadism. Of course one might 
expect this during periods of instability associated with rapid imperial expansion, 
including conversion for pecuniary reasons and religious conversion. In the face of 
military setbacks  or schismatic divisions (e.g. Sunni/Shiite), it might be argued that 
interpretation and application of these Hadiths could be quite variable. Indeed the nature 
and complexity of the local environment and the level of external and/or internal threats 
might well determine the nature of the jihadist response at any particular period. Thus 
while there might be outward constancy in Qur’anic textual interpretation (see Table 2.2 
above) the pragmatic application of these texts might be quite variable over time (see 
Figure -1, the Jihadist Wheel).  
 
Miskat al-Masabih (vol 1: 807) provides us with a hadith which highlights the 
multifaceted nature of jihad: Abu ‘Abs reported God’s messenger as saying,   
           The martyr receives six good things from God: he is forgiven at the first 
shedding of his blood; he is shown his abode in paradise; he is preserved from the 
punishment in the grave; he is kept safe from the greatest terror; he has placed on 
his head the crown of honour a ruby which is better than the world and what it 
contains; he is married to seventy-two wives or the maidens with large dark eyes, 
and is made intercessor for seventy of his relatives.13 
 
 From the Table above it might be argued that that the aim of jihadist hadiths was the 
support of physical struggle which was frequently associated with offensive warfare 
within an imperial edifice that was generally expanding without serious impediment in 
the early centuries of Islam (c.7th-11th). 
                                                  
13
 Ibid, p.223 
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2.5  Jihad in Islamic scholarship 
  
 In his book, ‘Jurisprudence in Muhammad’s Biography,’ the Cairo Azhar scholar, 
Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti wrote the following: ‘The Holy War (Islamic Jihad), 
as it was known in Islamic Jurisprudence, was basically an offensive war. It was the duty 
of Muslims in every age to respond to the call for jihad.     Thus the apostle of God said: I 
was commanded to fight the people until they believe in Allah and his messages…’14 In 
629  the  Prophet Muhammad sent out ten military detachments from among his 
followers to the scattered tribes in the Arabian Peninsula with the call (da’wa) to  accept 
Islam, otherwise they would be killed. 15 Buti quoted the  Prophet Muhammad as saying:, 
‘Fight Jews and Christians because they violated the origin of their faith and they do not 
believe in the religion of the truth (Islam), which abrogated all other religions. Fight them 
until they pay the poll-tax (jizya ) with submission and humiliation.’16  Buti also 
observes,  
           [T]he concept of Holy War (Jihad) in Islam does not take into 
consideration whether it is a defensive or an offensive war. Its goal is the 
exaltation of the Word of Allah and the construction of Islamic society and the 
establishment of Allah’s Kingdom on Earth regardless of the means …it is legal 
to carry on a Holy War to erase all other religions from the soil of the Arab 
Peninsula.17   
 
We can see this in its modern purist form in Saudi Arabian Wahhabism, which does not 
allow any non-Muslim religion to exist in this country. 
                                                  
14
 “Jurisprudence in Muhammad’s Biography” by Dr. Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti, Trans. By 
Maulana  Muhiuddin Khan, Khademu Harmain Sharifain, (Saudi Arabia, Madina Mannwara),7th Edition, 
1413 Hijri, p.134.  
15
 Ibid, p.263. 
16
 Ibid, p.252. 
17
 Ibid, p.269. 
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The well-known Egyptian Islamist scholar, Sayyid Qutb (d.1966), notes four pragmatic 
stages in the development of jihad: 
1.  While the earliest Muslims remained in Mecca before fleeing to Medina, God   
did not allow them to fight (clearly they lacked the military capability to use 
force); 
2.  Permission was given to Muslims [in Medina]to fight against their oppressors    
(prudence determined this to be the most practical way  to survive); 
3.  God commands Muslims to fight those who fight them ( this equated to the 
best  method of survival); 
4. God commands the Muslims to fight against all polytheists ( this was necessary 
for survival and proselytisation)  
Sayyid Qutb views each stage to be replaced by the next stage in this order, the fourth 
stage to remain permanent. To justify the universal and permanent dimensions of jihad he 
cites the following Qur’anic passages: Q.4:74-78 (‘fight in the cause of Allah’); Q.8:38-
40 (‘fight them until there is no fitna’); Q.9:29-32 (‘fight those who do not believe in 
Allah’). Qutb  also believes that, the West is incapable of ascertaining the true nature of   
Islam  and that the Islam has a right to take the initiative, by force if necessary, in the 
interests of  human liberty and freedom. Thus wherever an Islamic community exists 
which is a concrete example of the divinely-ordained system of life, it has a God-given 
right to step forward and to take control of the political authority so that it may establish  
God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya) on earth. Sayyid Qutb, however, pours scorn upon those 
who view jihad as solely defensive (as the jihadist must be one-step ahead of his 
adversary).  Likewise, the popular Indian Muslim revivalist Abu’l Ala Mawdudi rejects 
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any distinction between offensive and defensive jihad. At first, as in the case of the 
Indian modernists of the later half of the nineteenth century (Aligarh cf. Sir Sayyed 
Ahmed Khan) the defense against the unfavourable image of Islam was only timidly 
voiced. Convinced of the superiority of the West and Western culture as they were, they 
tried to show that Islam was a respectable religion that fostered the same values as 
Christendom and Western civilization in general.  Later, many Muslim thinkers came to 
see these accusations as a functional part of the European colonial policy towards the 
Islamic world. Since Islam, in their view, was the ideological stronghold against Western 
penetration, they regarded these Western accusations as attempts to weaken Islam so as to 
be able to subjugate the entire Islamic world. Thus their tone in refuting these Western 
allegations against Islam became bolder and more aggressive. They pointed at the 
political implications and violently denounced the evil designs and cunning methods of 
the Western powers. The Western accusations with regard to the doctrine of jihad were, 
in their view, to be placed in this political context. Many of them (the Western 
orientalists) have written on certain aspects of it (jihad), on the basis of what their 
fanaticism, their whims and their repulsion have dictated with the aim of attacking Islam 
in its scientific and intellectual origin. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
This is the very reason why ‘orientalism’ (cf. Edward Said) came into being and why 
orientalists began launching their attacks against the Islamic East by assailing its 
nationalism, its language and its religion. Their main interest was jihad as this is the 
principle that forms the foremost rank for protecting Islam. Therefore, they made it the 
object of a large scale attack in order to weaken the morale of the Muslims and to make 
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them feel that they were the oppressors of other peoples. They (orientalists) still depict 
the Muslims as ferocious animals, lying in wait to hurl themselves upon the world in 
order to destroy all traces of civilization and culture (cf. Daniel Pipes). This will make 
non-Muslim people averse to accepting Islam in this form and will diminish the alleged 
danger of the Muslims for the Christians. However, it is well known that the opposite is 
true.  Orientalism18  paved the way for colonial domination by spreading skepticism 
about the fundamental values of the Arabs and the Muslims. 19        
 
A typical feature of these apologetic writings can be seen in other areas like a comparison 
between Western and Christian practice on one hand and Islamic ideals on the other. 
Specific types of apologetic literatures on jihad, which are entirely instructive in 
character and lack any mobilizing aspects, are those writings that expound the theory of 
jihad as a form of international law. This is seen as the emphasis on the basically peaceful 
character of the relationship between the Islamic world and the other states and in the 
demonstration that Islam has been capable of constructing a detailed, just and merciful 
system of international law. 
 
 In modern Islamist literature on jihad we often find sources  extolling the virtues of jihad 
and the bliss of the martyrs in the Hereafter supported with numerous quotations from the 
Qur’an (see Table- 2.1 above). A typical example is a booklet published by the Azhar 
                                                  
18
 Edward W. Said, Orientalism,(New York: Random House,1979) 
19
 Rudolph Peters,  Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers,  
1996), pp.109-110. 
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University on the occasion of the June war of 1967 under the title of  Jihad in Islam20 
which contains the following chapter: ‘Jihad in the Holy Koran’. It is an enumeration of 
Qur’anic verses with regard to jihad. Jews are vilified as ‘the worst enemies of humanity’. 
The title of the last chapter – Marvelous Islamic images of sacrifice’, emphasizes Muslim 
heroism and contempt for death  from the days of Muhammad to the Palestine war of 
1948. 
 
On the other hand, many fatwas were published clarifying specific points of the law with 
regards to jihad. Fatwas concerning jihad have been published in great numbers in recent 
years. Generally they have been to the effect that jihad had become an individual 
obligation (fard’ayn), because the enemy had invaded Islamic territory. It is obvious that 
the contents of these fatwas is to a large extent political as the application of the shari’a 
in a given situation, depends on the political evaluation of that situation and may give rise 
to different answers. 
 
The notion of jihad at-tarbiya (educational jihad), which means the spreading of the 
Islamic values in Muslim society, may be compared with the idea of jihad ad-da’wa, 
spreading Islam amongst the unbelievers by peaceful means, such as argumentation and 
demonstration (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). Some modern authors hold that this is 
the most important current form of jihad.21 They believe that nowadays intensive 
communication is possible without having recourse to military expeditions. Therefore, 
fighting as a means of propagation of Islam has become obsolete and must now be 
                                                  
20
 Al-jihad fil-Islam (Cairo: Jami’atal-Azhar/al-Hay’aal-‘Ammali-Shu’un al-Matabi’al-Amiriyya,1967), pp 
82, in Syed Kamran Mirza, “An Exegesis on ‘Jihad in Islam,’” News from Bangladesh, 19 June, 2002. 
21
 Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) p. 37. 
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replaced by the concept of jihad ad-da’wa. Some of those writers fear that the emphasis 
on the peaceful side of jihadism may divert the Muslims from the necessary struggle (i.e. 
the Lesser Jihad). They often interpret these forms of spiritual and moral jihad as a 
prerequisite for ‘fighting’ in the way of Allah:  
 
             Jihad begins with jihad against oneself by purifying one’s soul from [bad] 
inclinations   and passions and with its orientation towards God, [for one ought] not [to 
struggle] out of love for fame, or desire for pleasure or in hope of worldly matters. 
Whoever fights to show his courage and to acquire fame and money, cannot be regarded 
a mujahid, for a mujahid fights only to please God, to obtain what He has in store for 
him, to raise the truth and to make God’s word the highest22      
 
Islamists, for example, put emphasis on the militant aspect of jihad, including the concept 
of al-jihad bi-l-nafs (partaking in jihad by putting one’s life at stake), through al-jihad bi-
l-sayf (jihad with the sword).23 This has become the most important emphasis in 
contemporary jihadist literature, which often includes discussion about strategic issues 
(especially in Iraq) confronting Muslim societies. Not surprisingly, jihadist literature, 
which abounds in internet websites (e.g. Middle East Media Research Institute 
(MEMRI)), receives most attention from the Western media, notwithstanding the 
extensive coverage of Middle East news networks such as al-Jazeera. 
 
 Mawdudi rejects any distinction between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ forms of jihad. So 
also the distinguished contemporary Pakistani scholar, Fazlur Rahman, while recognizing 
the extensive presence of jihad in the Qur’an, rejects the stand of modern Muslim 
apologists who have tried to explain the jihad of the early (Muslim) community in purely 
                                                  
22
 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, 1996, pp 117-118. 
23
 Ibid. 
PDF Created with deskPDF PDF Writer - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
                                                                                                                          Chapter-2 
 50
defensive terms.24 Rudolph Peters argues that the ‘ultimate aim of jihad is ‘the 
subjugation of the unbelievers’ and the extirpation of unbelief’.25  All of these Islamic 
authorities simply echo the belief that Islam’s fundamental assumption of world 
sovereignty must be in the hands of the Muslims. As the Qur’an says (Q.16: 101) :  ‘And 
when We substitute a verse in place of a verse – and Allah is most knowing of what He 
sends down—they say, “ you, [O Muhammad], are but an inventor [of lies]. But most of 
them do not know.”26 On the basis of these verses there arose within the Muslim 
community the principle of Qur’anic interpretation, called naskh (abrogation). This 
stipulated that earlier peaceful verses could be abrogated by later militant verses (i.e., in 
the case of jihad the Meccan verses were abrogated by the Medinan verses). What it has 
signified in the past and signifies at present for many Muslims is well summarized in a 
statement by Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), Islam’s great historian, sociologist and 
philosopher:  
           In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the 
universalism of the (Muslim) mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to 
Islam either by persuasion or by force. Therefore, caliphate and royal authority 
are united in (Islam), so that the person in charge can devote the available strength 
to both of them at the same.27     
  
However it is important to argue that the classical concept of jihad which upholds the 
Qur’anic ideal of ‘fighting’ in the name of God simply reflects one view or tradition of 
this otherwise highly complex process relating to the foundation of Muslim religio-
political behaviour. As we have seen, jihadism is a multifaceted concept which might 
                                                  
24
 Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) p. 37. 
25
 Rudolph Peters, “Jihad”, The Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan,1987) Vol. 8, pp. 88-91. 
26
 The Qur’an,(Riyadh: Saheeh International,1997), p.368. 
27
 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. By Franz Rosenthal  (New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1958) 
Vol.1, p.473. 
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under certain environmental circumstances include the need for ‘offensive’ or ‘defensive’ 
struggle, including the need for violence (i.e. local wars against non-Muslims or deviant 
Islamic elites), while at other times it might have entirely peaceful non-political struggle 
(i.e. an increase in religious piety and proselytism (see Figure-1, the Jihadist Wheel) as its 
major goal.  But  the interaction of these two elemental aspects or faces of jihad might 
depend more on the nature of the historical process and on the specific environment in 
which the jihadist organization and individual (mujahid) exists than on immutable 
Qur’anic injunctions associated with the belief in divine guidance.  
 
 Thus the Jihadist Wheel (see Chapter 1) shows that it is at least theoretically possible for 
jihadist behaviour to oscillate rapidly or slowly between the Greater and Lesser Jihads as 
a result of specific environmental factors impacting upon the local Muslim community at 
any given time. Notwithstanding the Qur’anic injunction to ‘fight’ in the name of God, 
the nature of the impending struggle would depend on many other subjective and 
objective criteria impacting upon the lives of the political elite as well as the grass root 
members of jihadist organizations responding to the  traditional  call (da’wa) to respond  
as committed Muslims.     In the next chapter we will examine the historical approach and 
origin of the Islamic jihad.      
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                            Islamic Jihad: Historical Approach  
                                                  
  
 
3.1 Rise of Islam: Early Era 
Islam represented a military threat to the very physical existence of Christendom. This, 
and Islam’s achievement in scientific and intellectual fields during its heyday in the 
Middle Ages, caused a reaction in the West that epitomized Islam as cruel, evil, and 
uncivilized - images no doubt reinforced as a result of the Crusades between the.11th and 
13th centuries. It is interesting that Muslims formed similar images of the ‘crusaders’, 
which still haunt them to the present day. The medieval notion of overwhelming the 
crusaders (salibiyin) can be found in the writings of Sayyid Qutb (i.e. Milestones) and 
serves as the justification for jihad as-sayf (jihad of the sword) and of course, martyrdom 
(istishad).  
 
We have seen in Chapter 2 that the Islamic concept of jihad evolved in response to 
certain historical circumstances reflecting a series of perceived divine interactions 
between God and the Prophet Muhammad. During the eighth and ninth centuries, the 
concept of jihadism evolved and was accepted by the schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
(madhhab) as the ideological tool for the realization of the Dar al-Islam.1 However, other 
sources suggest that the early Muslim community was far from unanimous in its views 
                                                  
1
 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
Press,1955) 
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about jihad.2 They pointed out that various factions within the Muslim community 
competed for influence over the direction early Islam followed in its views of war. The 
Qur’an and early traditional literature tell us that some early Muslims were quite militant, 
while others refused to go to war. Some wished to promote Islam with the sword, (sayf) 
while others were willing to do so with peace (salaam). Some were ready to initiate war 
in order to advance the cause of Allah (jihad), while others were only willing to fight in 
defense of the newly born Islamic community (umma). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how the Islamic community (umma) developed its 
theory of jihad or war (harb) in the earliest period of its history and how this influenced 
subsequent developments of jihadism. 
 
Islam consists of a complex system of values and rituals, theology, folklore, law, faith 
and spiritual rewards (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). It contains within it the deep and 
simple, the sublime and cruel, the exalted and the ignoble. Like Judaism and Christianity, 
Islam is multifaceted and offers a variety of responses to the questions and perplexities of 
the human condition. It is impossible to force it into a single box. Not only are there 
differences between Shiites (Heterodox), Sunnis (Orthodox), and Sufis (Mystics) of 
which the West may be generally familiar, within each of these and other Muslim groups 
may be found an abundance of subgroups expressing differing views and trends.   
 
The term jihad or holy war suggests many things to different people. (see Figure-1) 
However, little has been done to study the formation and evolution of the notion of  
                                                  
2
 Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
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divinely sanctioned war (jihad) in Islam.  The concept of jihad quickly became a 
powerful motivator on the expansion and extent of Islamic empires. This included 
political and religious policy, international economics and law, and the self-perception of 
individual Muslims and the universal Muslim community. The concept of jihad in early 
Islam is highly interesting when we see that pre-Islamic Arabia apparently was not 
concerned with either ideological or religiously sanctioned war.3  
 
 
3.2 Role of War in Pre-Islamic Arabian Society   
 
The study of war is a vast field comprising historical, tactical, and psychological 
approaches along with those in the fields of economics, political science, history and so 
on. Therefore, because of the great variety of interests and approaches even the definition 
of war itself finds no universal acceptance. However, in most general terms, war may be 
defined as an organized, purposeful activity directed by one established group against a 
rival group that involves actual or potential application of lethal force.4 War does not 
always mean physical combat. It may be a state of condition (eg. long-term grievances 
over territory) between human groups even when warfare is not actually being conducted. 
The Cold War, (1945-91), for example, represented a state of affairs in which actual and 
direct combat between the principal parties never took place. The doctrine of jihad in 
Islam  likewise purports to define a state of relationship between the Islamic world (Dar 
                                                  
3
 F.E. Peters, Muhammad and the Origins of Islam, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994 ) 
4
 R. Brian Ferguson, “Studying War,” in R. Brian Ferguson, ed., Warfare, Culture, and Environment 
(Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1984), pp 3-5. 
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al-Islam) and the non-Islamic world (Dar al-Harb).5  However, the term ‘holy war’ is 
primarily a European convention and derives from the study of war in its own [European] 
contexts.   Although holy war is defined most broadly as religious justification for 
engaging in war, it does not necessarily presume a connection of military activity to 
religious purposes. Some expression of holy war exists in virtually all religious traditions 
and is certainly the most common and persistent expression of ideological war. All, 
however, can be said to represent divinely justified engagement in war. This particular 
expression of holy war found in the Islamic world tends to be referred to in the West as 
jihad (see Figure -1 the Jihadist Wheel).  Therefore, jihad cannot simply be equated with 
holy war, for its meaning is much broader. It includes, for example, many activities (see 
Figure-1) unrelated to warfare and is determined in part by legal criteria that parallel the 
concept of  the just-war (justum bellum)  in the West. However, it would not be 
inaccurate to suggest a definition of the subcategory of ‘jihad of the sword’ as any act of 
warring authorized by legitimate Muslim authorities (i.e.ulama) on behalf of the religious 
community and contributing to the greater good of Islam. Moreover, Islam does not limit 
religiously authorized war to the term jihad. The terms qital (fighting) and harb (war) 
found in the Qur’an and in post-Qur’anic religious literature also deal with fighting. Harb 
is a generic term for war and refers usually to wars that are not necessarily legitimized by 
religious authority, while qital  in the way of Allah (fi sabil Allah) is virtually 
synonymous with jihad when it is understood as war in the way of God.6 
 
                                                  
5
 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955) 
pp.62-65.  
6
 Qital is highly specific in its meaning of fighting. For qital in the way of God, we can see Suras 
2:190,244, 246; 3:13, 167; 4:74-76, 84; 9:111; 21:4; 73:20. As well as Harb is also common in the Qur’an. 
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In pre-Islamic Arabia war was a normal part of life. However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that religious restrictions  had any significant effect on this aspect of traditional 
pre-Islamic Arabian life.  In central Arabia, however, raiding and intertribal aggression 
remained non-ideological. It was not associated in any way with the range of fighting 
defined as ‘holy war’. Martyrdom has little meaning in such a social system for no 
transcendent meaning was applied to the act of war, nor was reward in an afterlife a part 
of the indigenous Arabian worldview. The economic and social benefits of war were 
strong reason to engage in the act of war.  Neither religion nor what we today would call 
‘moral consciousness’ within this social system had any impact on war in general. This 
entire system changed significantly but not easily with the coming of Islam.7This typical 
Islamic attitude toward pre-Islamic days had its  very own clear mission and most of this 
process of violence  was renamed in the Qur’an as qital or jihad.                         
 
 
 
3.3 The Qur’an: Constitution of Jihad 
 
 
The Qur’an is the earliest and most important document in Islam but there is considerable 
controversy over its provenance and dating. The traditional Muslim view holds that the 
Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad over   a twenty-three year period of his 
mission from approximately 610 AD to his death in 632 AD. According to Islamic 
tradition all these revelations were never committed systematically to writing during the 
lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, but it was known in the community (umma al-
Islamiyya) almost entirely in oral form until his death. A written text was apparently 
                                                  
7
  Reuven Firestone, Ibid. 
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established and edited some eighteen years later under the caliphate of Uthman (644-56 
AD). It is believed that the Uthmanic text is faithful scripture, true to the revelations 
received by the Prophet, and is clearly dated to his lifetime.8 However, huge repetition, 
contradiction and possible dislocation within the Qur’an create significant challenges for 
scholars.9 Therefore seemingly unrelated verses (Meccan and Medinan periods) 
frequently sit side by side. The problem of organization is of great importance because 
the relationship of verses to one another strongly affects both the meaning of individual 
verses and especially with reference to jihad. (see Figure -1)  
 
As the transition marker from the pre-Islamic to the Islamic period,  the Qur’an expresses 
a worldview  significantly different from what we know of pre-Islamic Arabian culture. 
Some examples of the major changes reflected in the Qur’an include the view that life 
was governed by God (Allah) and that human kind and dependence on God are 
emphasized in place of living the good life on earth and enjoying simple material well-
being. On the other hand, the Qur’an naturally incorporates many ancient Arabian 
attitudes and beliefs as well as preserving many aspects of pre-Islamic worldviews, even 
in its condemnation or adjustment of certain of the old ways10.  
 
The Qur’an refers to war in sura 2:216 as follows: ‘Warfare is ordained for you’, The 
message seems to imply that  God understands [all] things that men do not.11  Some  
                                                  
8
 Adam C. Coogle, Verses of Fighting in The Qur’an (Florida: Florida State University, 2005) pp.8-44. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 H.A.R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, Stanford Shaw and William Polk, eds. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press,1982), pp. 179-181,187-196.  
11
 Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003) p.20 
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modern interpretation of the Qur’an suggest  that  ‘War is a social necessity.’12 The most 
often cited verses express a highly ideological approach to war (harb). They are 
understood by some sources to command ‘unlimited’ war against non-Muslims, to enjoin 
the killing of idolaters, and to refuse to offer peace (salaam) until Islam is the hegemonic 
religion.13 The Qur’anic message on war, however, is highly inconsistent. The verses on 
jihad (lit. to exert or struggle) or qital (killing)  are spread out over more than a dozen 
chapters (suras). With reference to hostility towards the Jewish people some Muslims 
now quote the passages in the Qur’an that refer to Muhammad’s struggle with the Jewish 
tribes to justify their belief.  Decontextually, these verses could be seen  to distort  both 
the message of the Qur’an and the attitude of the Prophet, who himself never felt  such 
hatred of Judaism14. It is always very difficult to understand whether a verse is supposed 
to be read in relation to the verses among which it is currently situated or whether it may 
be read independently.15 Therefore, it is likely given the huge collection of unrelated 
verses on jihad and qital in suras 2,3,8 and 9.  The insertion of such verses often confuses 
the meaning and relationship of the verses into which they had been inserted, some 
Qur’anic statements may or may not even refer to war.16  The sentiments, ideologies, 
concepts and attitudes expressed by the many verses cover a wide range of positions. 
 
As we know,  pre-Islamic Arabia was a  violent society and the newly born umma had to 
fight its way to survive. The Qur’an teaches that war is such a catastrophe that Muslims 
                                                  
12
 The Qur’an, 2:251. (Riyadh: Saheeh International,1997). Also in http://www.ummah.net/what-is-
islam/war/war1.htm , and  http://www.submission.org/war.html  Last accessed 02/05/2008 
13
 Reuven Firestone, Ibid.  
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
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must use every method in the way of Allah.17 After the Battle of the Trench, Muhammad 
felt that it was the time to abandon the jihad and begin a peace offensive. Jihad as 
presented in the Qur’an, particularly involves change in one’s self and mentality (see 
Figure-1). It may concern the sacrifice of material property, social class or heritage and 
even emotional comfort solely for the Salvation and Worship of Allah. As a result, one 
who practices jihad will gain tremendously in the Hereafter.18 The Qur’an always 
emphasized life after death and afterlife is more important to  Muslims. Since these 
verses show that Allah accepts only justice, so fighting in the name of Allah is fighting in 
the name of justice.19 
 
Only after the Emigration (Hijra) of the Muslim community to Medina in 622 were 
Muhammad and the believers given divine authority (i.e. had the military capabilities) to 
engage in war, and then only in self-defense.20 However, the Muslim community 
continued to grow in numbers and strength in Medina, further revelations widened with 
conditions which narrowed the restrictions under which war could be waged,21 until it 
was concluded that war against non-Muslims could be waged  at any time,  and in any 
place.22 (see Figures 2 and 3).  Therefore it is clear that even at the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad jihad became subjected to the political situation confronting the umma al-
Islamiyya. 
 
                                                  
17
 The Qur’an, 8: 16-17. 
18
 The Qur’an, 93:4. 
19
 The Qur’an, 4:65, 124, 135. 
20
 The Qur’an, 2:190; 22:39-40. 
21
 The Qur’an, 2:191, 217. 
22
 The Qur’an, 2:216; 9:5, 29. Sura 9:5  
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 As we see in Sura 2:190 ‘Fight in the path of God those who fight you, but do not 
transgress limits, for God does not love transgressors.’23 According to the tradition, Sura 
2:190 was revealed in 628  or just after the truce of al-Hudaybiyya.24 Muhammad’s 
decision to enter into a pact with the enemy based on their own [political] terms was so 
controversial that  Umar (2nd Caliph, 632-644) publicly opposed it. The revelation of 
2:190 at this occasion may be seen as providing justification for Muhammad’s 
controversial [political] compromise.  It is interesting to note that the good (khayr) or bad 
(sharr) of war is also measured in these sources according to material rather than 
ideological standards. Fighting is good ‘because following the fighting is victory and 
triumph over the enemy and the capture of their towns, wealth, progeny and children.’25 
Thus the meaning of religion according to the tradition is not just simply generic 
monotheism but, rather, the particular monotheism of Islam as known by ‘worship and 
obedience to Allah according to His command and prohibition’.26Islam, therefore, must 
be the religion of dominion. We can easily demonstrate these different phases of jihad by 
this table below. 
 
              
 
        
 
 
                                                  
23
 The Qur’an 
24
 Tafsir Muqatil, (Dhaka: The Islamic Foundation of Bangladesh) 1979, vol. 5 p.79. 
25
 Ibid, p.184.   
26
 Ibid, p. 194. 
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           Table- 3.1: Evolution of Islamic Jihad or Transitional form of Jihad 
Situation Type of Jihad Supportive 
Verses 
Goal Type of 
Outcome 
City State 
(622-661 AD) 
Offensive, 
Aggressive, 
Expansive 
Sword Verses Dar al-Islam Islamic Empire 
Empire: (661-
1258) 
Dar al-Islam 
Offensive Sword Verses Dar al-Islam  Defence of 
Islamic empire 
Dar al-Sulh; 
Reconciliation 
(c.16th ) 
Reactionary/ 
Defensive/ 
Peace Loving 
Freedom, Peace 
Verses 
Da’wah, 
Cooperation 
with local 
people  
Deadlock with 
enemies 
Fragmentation;  
1453-1918 
Ottoman; 
Persian; 
Mughal 
Offensive; 
Defensive 
Jihad verses War against 
enemies 
Islam in retreat 
Nation State 
Phase 1918 
Defensive Greater Jihad Freedom from 
colonial powers 
Fragmentation 
and loss of 
identity 
Revivalism; S. 
Qutb, Osama 
bin Laden 
Offensive; 
Aggressive; 
Expansive 
Sword Verses Dar al-Islam Seek  universal 
caliphate and 
rejuvenation of 
Islam 
 Source: Adapted from Harris Proctor, Islam and International Relations, (London: Pall Mall, 1965)                
 
We can see very clearly that historically jihad displays its own various religio-political 
forms. Muslims empires and states used this Qur’anic concept as a political tool to fulfill 
their political agenda. Jihad has been adopted or interpreted to meet different historical 
situations confronting Muslims. The transition from the mundane or materially driven 
fighting of pre-Islamic Arabia to the sacred and divinely sanctioned jihad of Islam under 
the Prophet Muhammad and the first four Righteous Caliphs occurred within a very short 
period.  Pre-Islamic [jahiliyya] fighting was seemingly non-ideological and was 
conducted either for material gain (booty) or simply to retaliate. Fighting in the fully 
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developed Islamic system, on the other hand, became a highly religio-political or 
ideological issue despite the added benefit of material gain in the form of spoils and also 
a responsibility of religious commitment.27 In theory this suggests a transition from 
random internecine conflict to holy war. In theory religious affiliation replaced kinship 
affiliation as the religious community replaced the tribe. This transition was difficult and, 
as will be noted below, never entirely successful. Schismatic and revivalist movements in 
the course of history (i.e. Kharijites, Zaidis, Shiites, Ismailis and Sufi brotherhoods etc.) 
were often influenced by the need to ensure the sanctity and purity of the faith.  
 
Thus Jihad put under the microscope of a political scientist might be seen as a tool for 
reinforcing ideological commitment (both spiritual, political and if necessary military). 
Failure of course to uphold these commitments might well lead to the demise of the 
community. So in the early Qur’anic period jihad was certainly a tool designed for 
political and military survival. (see Figures 2 and 4)  The reward of paradise might make 
its commitment more appealing to the community and of course to potential converts (see 
Figure-1). The ideological motivation for the current jihadist organisation might be said 
to be based on the classical notions of jihad with fitting adaptations to meet contingencies 
associated with the post-Cold War period. We address these and other questions in the 
next chapter.   
 
 
                                                  
27
 Adam C. Coogle, Ibid. 
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                       Case Study: Hamas and Politics of Jihad 
 
4.1 Hamas: A Synthesis of Religion and Nationalism 
 
 In our previous chapters we have analyzed the theory of jihad and its process of 
evolution since the times of the Prophet Muhammad. In this chapter our aim is to analyze 
the concept as a religio-political tool of Hamas (a Sunni Muslim jihadist organisation) 
committed to the setting up of an Islamic state in Palestine.  The ideology of Hamas 
(f.1988) is based on pan-Arab Islamic religious ideals and Palestinian nationalism. 
Hamas emphasizes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, in reality, a struggle between 
Islam and Zionism (i.e. the upbuilding of the Jewish national homeland in Palestine). It is 
along these lines that Article15 of the Hamas Charter states:  
         When our enemies usurp some Islamic lands, jihad becomes a duty binding 
on all Muslims. In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have 
no escape from raising the banner of jihad. This would require the propagation of 
Islamic consciousness among the masses on all local, Arab and Islamic levels. We 
must spread the spirit of Jihad among the [Islamic] Umma, clash with the enemies 
and join the ranks of the jihadist fighters.1  
 
                                                  
1
 The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Translated and 
annotated by Raphael Israeli, (Jerusalem: Harry Truman Research Institution, The Hebrew University,  
April 25, 1998), pp-7-8. 
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This view was reinforced in a booklet distributed by Hamas in early 1990 which stated: 
‘Our struggle with the Jews is a struggle between truth and emptiness- between Islam and 
Judaism’.2 
 
Despite its emphasis upon the Islamic pan-Arab ideal, Hamas simultaneously stresses that 
it is a very authentic Palestinian movement with the primary goal of solving the 
‘Palestinian problem.’ In Article 12 of its charter, Hamas attempts to reconcile the 
contradiction between its pan-Islamic character and its specifically Palestinian national 
aspirations: ‘Hamas regards nationalism (Wataniyya) as part and parcel of the religious 
faith,’ which indicates that Hamas is committed to religious nationalism. As well as, 
according to Hamas (see Table- 4.1), nothing is loftier or deeper in nationalism than 
waging jihad against the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of the 
Muslims.  This becomes an individual duty binding on every Muslim man and woman to 
participate in the jihad. Hamas’ charter is even more specific on this point when we see 
this extreme statement recalling classical Islam: ‘A woman must go out and fight the 
enemy even without her husband’s authorization, and a slave without his master’s 
permission.’3  
 
We have seen previously jihad in its classical form - now to what extent is this reflected 
in the way in which Hamas addresses the problem of jihad? Hamas has emerged from the 
turmoil of the unresolved conflict between Israel and the Palestinian, including two 
intifadas. Unlike the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) it has a charter that was 
                                                  
2
 Hamas Leaflet # 69 (November 1990) 
3
 The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), p.6 
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committed to the setting up of a religious state in Palestine. On religious and national 
grounds it was opposed to any major political concessions to Israel, and in principle 
sought the demise of the Zionist state. Of necessity jihad as an ideology would therefore 
have to be determined by the ability of the organization to sustain an ongoing conflict 
against a superior military force with nuclear weapons and close military and political 
ties to the United States (or ‘Great Satan’). The offensive nature of any struggle would 
have to be tempered by the military and political consequences of any massive retaliation 
by the enemy, on the one hand, and the reaction of secular elements of the Palestinian 
community (Fatah/PLO) committed to the peace process, on the other.      
Table- 4.1: Typology of Nationalism: Characteristics of Hamas  
Nationalism   Hamas 
 Civic Nationalism Strong religio-political 
elite base 
Ethnic Nationalism Strong Arab identity 
Expansionist Nationalism Revolutionary 
commitment within 
Palestine 
Cultural Nationalism Primarily  Palestinian 
national identity 
Third World Nationalism Strong Reaction to 
colonial military 
occupation 
State Nationalism Limited in first phase  to 
Palestinian Occupied 
Territories (OPTS) 
Religious Nationalism Primarily Arab-Islamic 
religion 
Extremism and Nationalism Islamic-Jihadist in nature: 
commitment to shari’a 
state. 
Source: http://www.fresno.k12.ca.us  also in http:// www.fordham.edu last Accessed 
15/04/2006 (Adopted and developed by discussion with my supervisor)   
 
PDF Created with deskPDF PDF Writer - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
                                                                                                                   Chapter-4 
 70
Hamas is a religio-political organization committed to the realization of a religious-based 
Islamic state in Palestine. Outwardly it has clear theocratic objectives (see Table 4.1 
above).  While other forms of secular nationalisms consist of material, human and 
territorial considerations, the nationality of Hamas also relates to religious considerations, 
which give substance and form to its   political goals.  
 
Hamas (1988) is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (1929) in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (OPT), or as defined in the second and fifth articles of the Hamas 
Charter: Hamas- the Islamic Resistance Movement- is a division of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Palestine. For example, ‘The Moslem Brotherhood is international and 
the largest of the Islamic movements in the modern era…The Islamic Resistance 
Movement is a specifically Palestinian movement. Its loyalty is to Allah and its 
commitment is to Islam as a way of life’.4 The Muslim Brotherhood in the OPTs was 
formed during the years 1967-1977, when the Islamic-religious forces joined ranks under 
the aegis of similar groups in Arab countries, mainly Egypt and Jordan, to form a single 
movement. In 1978 the movement led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin registered as a non-profit 
organization called the jam’iya (religious community). During the years 1967-1975 the 
role of the Islamic-movement was characterized by the building of mosques, bringing the 
younger generation into the fold, providing them with guidance and strengthening their 
ideology. To this end the movement utilized all means at its disposal. Ideology and 
religion were preached at clubs, schools and universities and even mosques. An entire 
generation was encouraged to open its eyes and discover Jewish (Zionist) plots against 
the Palestinian nation. 
                                                  
4
 Ibid, pp.2-5. 
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4.2 The origin of Hamas  
Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Hassan Yassin was born in 1938. He was forced to 
study at home because of his ill health where he read widely, especially on philosophical 
matters and on religion, politics, sociology and economics. This ability enabled Yassin to 
become totally involved in the lives of the Palestinians as a charismatic leader.  His 
worldly understanding, his followers believe, made him one of the best speakers in the 
Gaza Strip, drawing large crowds at Friday prayers when he delivered his weekly sermon 
as a prayer leader (Imam).5  
 
Sheikh Yassin’s contribution to the growth of the Islamic movement in Palestine emerged 
out of his conviction that students must have an Islamic education and understand the 
meaning of jihad. After the Egyptian revolution and the subsequent mass arrests of 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser’s regime extended its crackdown on the 
outlawed organizations to the Gaza Strip, which at that time was under Egyptian control 
(c.1948-67) Large numbers of Palestinian activists were arrested in 1966 and anyone 
engaged in Islamic politics was immediately under suspicion of planning to subvert the 
state.  
 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin had been active in Islamic politics in the Gaza Strip since the 
1970s. Like many of Hamas’ early members he was influenced by the revolutionary ideas 
of the Muslim Brotherhood-  Ikhwan al-Muslimin . The Brotherhood was created as an 
Islamic revivalist movement  following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1918) and 
                                                  
5
 Ze’ev  Schiff  and Ehud Ya’ari, Intifada, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 87. 
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what they saw as the creeping secularism and westernization of Egypt. Founded in 1928 
by Hassan al-Banna, a religious scholar, the Brotherhood became a political group in 
Egypt in 1936 when it took up the cause of Palestinian Arabs against the Zionists and 
British rule. Al-Banna known as the ‘Supreme Guide’, dispatched his Brothers as 
missionaries to preach the word and perform social, charitable, educational and religious 
work in towns and countryside alike (see Da’awa, in Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel).  
 
Following the ideas and teachings of the Brotherhood, Sheikh Yassin set up an Islamic 
Society in 1976. By 1978, it was felt that a bigger and better-organized institution was 
needed to promote Islamic values in Palestinian society, which for the Islamist was 
intimately bound up with resistance to Israel. That year he helped to set up another 
organization called the Islamic Compound. It was very interesting to see that the Israeli 
authorities gave permission to Yassin for his organization of the Islamic Compound in 
Tel Aviv as it was an indicator of what might become official Israeli policy. The Israeli 
government perceived its major enemy to be the nationalist and secular PLO (1964). By 
allowing Islamist rivals to flourish, Israel security believed that opposing Palestinian 
groups would do its work on the ground in a way that did not necessitate active Israeli 
involvement. 
 
Sheikh Yassin, envisaged the development of Hamas under four clearly defined stages. 
The first phase was to build its institutions, charities and social committees, which would 
open their doors to the young and old and  anyone who could play a role in resisting the 
occupier. This was a prelude to their confrontation with the Israeli enemy in the first 
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Intifada (1987-93), which according to Sheikh Yassin was instigated single-handedly by 
Hamas and without the involvement of other Palestinian factions. The PLO leadership 
was exiled in Tunis and not directly involved in the day to day running of events in the 
OPT. However, it later became involved in the Intifada. The second phase worked on 
strengthening the roots of the resistance within every household in the West Bank and 
Gaza and increasing its political credibility. The third stage developed its military 
capabilities from throwing Molotov cocktails to using guns, and other explosives 
(including suicide bombing). The final stage was to see Hamas moving beyond the 
Palestinian dimension, establishing a dialogue with its Arab and Islamic neighbours. 
 
 Hamas, the political organization, began life as the Islamic Resistance Movement, which 
was abbreviated to the acronym HMS from the original Arabic name Harakat al- 
Muqawama al- Islamiyya. It was finally proposed that HMS should become Hamas, an 
Arabic word meaning ‘zeal’, which embodies the virtues of the Muslim Brotherhood 
slogan: ‘Rights! Force! Freedom!’, all of which implied the essence of struggle or jihad. 
 
4.3 The Charter of Allah: A Brief Analysis 
 In its early years Hamas was led primarily by religio-political elites identified with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In the course of both Intifadas (1988-93 and 2001-2006), Hamas 
gained momentum, expanding its activity also in the West Bank to become the dominant 
Islamic fundamentalist organization in Palestine (as evidenced by its election as 
government of the Palestinian Authority in 2006). Hamas defined its highest priority as 
offensive jihad for the defence of the Palestinian people; the liberation of Palestine and 
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the establishment of an Islamic Palestine ‘from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan 
River’ (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). As we have seen, ‘offensive’ jihad is both 
rooted in Qur’anic texts (i.e. sword verses; see Appendix-1), Muslim historic experience 
and the practical necessity of liberating a Muslim people from alien domination.  
 
The basic structure of the Islamic Resistance Movement consists of Muslims who are 
devoted to Allah and worship Him: ‘I have created Man and Devil for the purpose of 
their worship’ [of Allah].6 Those Muslims are cognizant of their duty towards 
themselves, their families and country and they have been relying on Allah for all that. 
They have raised the banner of jihad in the face of the oppressors in order to extricate the 
country and the people from the [oppressors’] desecration, filth and evil: ‘Nay, but we 
hurl the true against the false; and it does break its head and lo! It vanishes’7 Now what is 
the ideological purpose this text? As we have seen, Hamas recruits Muslims (see 
Appendix-4, the Islamic Spectrum) who are deeply committed to Islam and are prepared 
to struggle to achieve their religio-political ideals and the creation of an Islamic state in 
the whole of Palestine. 
 
Hamas welcomes all Muslims who share its beliefs and  commit themselves to its course 
of action, keep its secrets and aspire to join its ranks in order to carry out their duty.  Its 
ultimate goal is an idealized form of Islamic shari’a state, with the Prophet as its model 
and the Qur’an as its Constitution. The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinct 
Palestinian movement which owes its loyalty to Allah, derives from Islam its way of life 
                                                  
6
 The Charter of Allah, p. 3 
7
 The Qur’an, (Riyadh: Saheeh International, 1997),21:18 
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and strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine. Thus in theory only 
under Islam could the members of all regions coexist in safety and security for their lives, 
properties and rights. By virtue of the distribution of Muslims, who pursue the cause of 
Hamas all over the globe, who strive for its victory, the reinforcement of its positions and 
for the encouragement of its jihad, the movement is a universal one. 
 
Hamas perceives itself as one of the links in the Chain of Jihad in its confrontation with 
Israel. For example, it has links  to: (1) the Martyr Izz a-din al-Qassam and the Muslim 
Brotherhood who fought the ‘Holy War’ against British occupation and  Jewish 
settlement in Palestine in 1936; (2) the Palestinian jihad and the jihadist  of the Muslim 
Brothers during the 1948 war; and (3), the jihadist operations of the Muslim Brothers in 
1968 and thereafter.8 It believes that the land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf 
(endowment) throughout the generations and, until the Day of Resurrections, no one can 
renounce it or any part of it, or abandon it.      
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
8
 The Charter of Allah,p.4 
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 Table- 4.2:  Typology of  Nationalism and Jihad 
Nationalism Elements of Jihad 
Ethnic nationalism Ethnic conflict 
Expansionist nationalism Radical ideology, patriotic sentiments, 
religious elements 
Cultural nationalism Basic cultural elements 
Third World nationalism Poverty, lack of education, absence of 
democracy.  
State nationalism concept of Islamic umma 
Religious nationalism Religious identity 
Extremism and nationalism Religion, political, social, and economic  
Source: http://www.fordham.edu  and http://www.fresno.k12.ca.us Last accessed 
14/04/2006.  (Adopted and developed by discussion with my supervisor) 
 
 
This Table helps us to understand the intra-relationship between the elements of jihad and 
differing forms of nationalism. As we have seen, Hamas regards religious nationalism 
(wataniyya) as part and parcel of its religious commitment. Unlike secular state 
nationalism, in theory it permits no clear distinction between the sacred and secular forms 
of the state. Nothing is loftier or deeper in terms of religious nationalism than waging 
jihad against the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of the 
Muslims, or threatens Muslims from afar. In theory, secular nationalism consists of 
material, human and territorial considerations as elements of state building. While the 
religious nationalism of Hamas carries [in addition to all those] the all important religious 
factor, which serves as the focal point of  its   religio-political agenda. 
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The problem of the liberation of Palestine might be described in terms of three interacting 
circles:9 the Palestinian, the Arabs and the Islamic world.   
Figure: 5              Interacting Circles of Palestinian Problem 
 
 
 Each of these circles has a role to play in the struggle against Zionism.  ‘Palestine’ was 
predominantly an Islamic land from the seventh century, including an Islamic waqf 
(endowment). It is believed to be sacred to all Muslims hence from a religious 
perspective it cannot be traded, sold or divided to accommodate the interests of non-
Muslims (i.e. Israel). In consequence of this state of affairs, Hamas believes that the 
liberation of that land is an individual duty binding of all Muslims everywhere: ‘When 
our enemies usurp some Islamic lands, Jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims.’10 
In order to confront the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, Muslims, according to 
Hamas, have no ‘escape’ from raising the banner of jihad. This would require the 
propagation (mobilization) of ideological awareness among the masses on all local, Arab 
and Islamic levels (see Table-4.2). Hamas believes that it must spread the spirit of jihad 
                                                  
9
 Ron Macintyre, Palestine-Israel: Conflict in the Modern Holy Land, (Auckland: Macmillan, 1997), p.4.  
10
 The Charter of Allah, p.7 
Palestine 
The 
Arabs 
Islamic 
World 
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among the [Islamic] umma, clash with its enemies and join the ranks of the jihad 
fighters.11 Here it is clearly seen that Hamas is facing the fragmented stage of jihad.  In 
Tables Table- 3.1 and 4.2 we can see that there is a certain organic inter-relationship 
between nationalism and jihad as well as an element of variability in the concept of jihad. 
For example, the nationalism to which Hamas adheres   contains a unique blend of 
religious ideals, embodied in the shari’a, and manifested by the nature of its jihadist 
commitment (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). Thus the level of jihadist commitment in 
an offensive sense might be  related to the level of violence perpetrated by Israel’s 
security forces upon the Palestinian Islamic community (i.e. force with force). For 
example, this might equate to either 10 or 11 o’clock  on the Jihadist Wheel (Figure 1).  
Thus the prescription for religious behaviour is provided with a pragmatic framework 
within which the strategic action and/or retaliatory response might take place. 
   
 Hamas’ charter reflects the historic experiences of the people of Palestine who in the 20th 
century have witnessed their historic homeland partitioned by the UN (1947) to 
accommodate the Jews of the Diaspora. The Charter expresses the mobilizing belief that 
Allah calls upon all his people to struggle (jihad) to overcome foreign occupation of a 
land that was previously designated as Islamic waqf or land that must not be sold or 
divided among aliens. Israel’s occupation and colonization of the greater part of Palestine 
has served as the catalyst for the emergence of a reinvigorated Hamas ideology, rooted in 
Qur’anic beliefs while finding practical expression in what at times resembles an anti-
colonial struggle against alien forces, which might also be described as jihadism.   
 
                                                  
11
 Ibid, p.8 
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As we have seen, Hamas believes that the liberation of the land of Palestine and 
especially the Holy City of Jerusalem (al-Quds) is an individual obligation binding on all 
Muslims everywhere. This might take the form of military struggle while at other times 
politicized spiritual commitment may be the ideal. Theoretically various oscillations of 
the Jihadist Wheel might lead to differing permutations of jihad in terms of response and 
commitment. The ideology and nationalism of Hamas reflect the level of faith or 
religious commitment of its adherents or cadres (i.e. guerrilla units, martyrs and political 
elites) towards the liberation of Palestine. Hamas cadres believe that, “A person is willing 
to die for his cause if it’s a question of its very existence.”12 This is typically accepted 
concept of martyrdom of Hamas.13 The highly structured and egalitarian social side of the 
community (jami’a), which is typical of other broadly based Islamist or jihadist 
organizations, educates its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the banner of 
Allah over their homeland as they engage in their jihad. The Charter serves as a tool not 
only for membership recruitment and religious instruction but also as a mechanism for 
the initiation of jihad and the elaboration of the ultimate goal of the organisation – an 
Islamic shari’a state in the whole of Palestine (see Table 4.2 above). The emphasis on 
these ideals might vary according to the differing oscillations of the Jihadist Wheel. It is 
therefore important to recognize that the concept of jihad, as understood by Hamas, is an 
all-encompassing ideology drawing from jihadist notions of the Qur’an (see Figure-2) 
and classical Islam, while embodying the day to day ‘defensive’ or peaceful [spiritual] 
aspirations of the Palestinian people and their ‘offensive’ struggle for national self-
determination.   
                                                  
12
 Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003) p. 70. 
13
 Ibid. 
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4.4 Foreign Policy of Hamas: Politics of Jihad and Realpolitik  
Since the late 1980s Hamas has viewed the world primarily in terms of an hostile reaction 
to the hegemonic policies advanced by the forces of U.S.‘imperialism’ and ‘Zionism’. In 
jihadist rhetoric they pose a major threat to the legitimacy and identity of the Islamic 
world (Dar al-Islam).  The idea that emerged from this bipolar image of the world was 
that of a civilizational struggle between the U.S- led imperialist and Zionist alliance and 
the world of Islam. Thus Hamas defined the nature of the problem with Israel and the US 
(West) as essentially a religious conflict against crusading forces (salibiyun). In theory it 
was in effect a zero sum conflict without accommodation or peaceful resolution. The 
conflict was between Islam and its enemies. Islam was therefore the cause and the 
solution.14 Thus Hamas views the contemporary world in terms of a two dimensional 
struggle between the forces of good, which it represents, and the forces of evil, 
represented by Israel and the US. As we have seen, this reflects Islamic classical notions 
of jihad (i.e. Dar al-Islam versus Dar al-Harb). The US and Israel in Islamic cosmology - 
the spiritual equivalent of the Greater and Lesser Satan - are believed to be working 
against the interests of Islamic nations.    
 
What is the organic relationship between Islam and its philosophical commitment to 
violence? As we have seen in Chapters 3, in Islam there is no clear separation between 
religion and politics. Thus according to classical notions of Islam, the ideal society 
should be a theocracy in which Allah himself is the monarch, reigning on earth 
(hakimiyya) through subordinates or vicegerents (khalifiyya).   Therefore, in theory Islam 
                                                  
14
 http://www.catholic.com  Last accessed 12/06/2006 
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is not only a religion, but a political ideology and set of immortal ideals reflected in 
Qur’anic revelations: in fact a total way of life. 15   
 
 Hamas’ ability to survive as a quasi-state government (2006-08) and  develop socially, 
economically and politically has been dependent on the actions of other states (e.g. Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Iran and Jordan), which at various points have seen the Islamist 
organization as an irritant, an enemy, a burden and an opportunity to be exploited.  Prior 
to the 1987 Palestinian Intifada (uprising), a military agenda was rarely part of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy. As Hamas gained support during the years of the first 
Intifada, it added a foreign affairs department to its political structure.  
 
Hamas’ most significant foreign relationships in 2007-08  have been with Syria, Iran and 
Jordan. The Iranian relationship is very interesting for the fact that Iran has traditionally 
supported Shiite groups, and Hamas’ membership is primarily Gaza-based and Sunni 
Muslim. Nonetheless, the Iranian connection is real and long-standing. It began shortly 
after Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990.  Hamas  in 1994, admitted the flourishing 
relations between Tehran and Hamas and  also  Iranian financial support to Hamas. 
According to their source, the budget allocated in 1991 by Iran to support the Palestinian 
Intifada was used to finance political campaigns and the activities of the Martyrs 
Foundation.16 Despite the allegation that Iran was funding ‘terrorist’ organizations in the 
                                                  
15
 Ibid 
16
 Ibid. 
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West, it  became  clear that the many shipments of weapons  successfully reached  
Hamas.  
 
However Syria’s relationship with Hamas derives from the early 1990s, when the first 
Intifada was developing in terms of conflict intensity. In concert with Iran, disagreement 
over Arafat’s support for the Oslo Accords’ (1993) land for peace deal with Israel further 
cemented their bond. Political relations between Iran, Syria, Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
strengthened after each suicide bombing or military attack attributed to these groups.  As 
support for Hamas grew inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip the relations between 
Hamas and Syria strengthened. Overall its membership seemed to be more committed 
and dedicated and prepared to commit suicide in the cause of the liberation of Palestine.  
 
 Hamas relies heavily on fundraising by wealthy Arabs, mainly from Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf region (see Figure-5, Hamas Funding), who finance charitable organizations 
associated with the disbursement of zakat (charity), one of the five pillars of Islam. 
Access to zakat and other charitable funds from wealthy residents of Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf, including Iran, enabled Hamas to acquire greater economic and military 
capabilities in the deepening struggle (jihad) against Israel and the West.   
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Table 4.3:  Financial Aid to Hamas (2003) 
Sources Amount  
Gulf States $ 12 Million a year 
Saudi Arabia $ 12-14 Million a year 
Iran $ 20-30 Million a year 
Charitable associations in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (OPTs)  
$ 4.5 Million a year* 
Charitable associations overseas  $ 6 Million a year* 
Fundraising abroad and in the OPTs 
(Hawala etc.) 
 
$ 10 Million a year*  
Source: www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-funds.htm 
Also in www.adl.org/NR/exeres . Last accessed 15/12/2007. * Estimate 
 
In the 1990s, the US began to oppose these sources of aid, calling on governments 
especially Gulf States to establish procedures to ensure only the genuinely impoverished 
received aid. It also emphasized the danger of financing the violent activities of al- 
Qaeda, Hizbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas. When Hamas was added to the terrorist list 
by the US State Department on 24 January 1995, Washington used its diplomatic 
channels to ask the Gulf States to take punitive action against all those in the oil-rich 
countries who had donated money to the discredited organization.17 In Jordan, the Islamic 
Action Front (IFA) (closely related to Hamas) was increasingly restricted in terms of its 
electoral access to parliament through a series of Draconian laws (c.2001-2007) which 
                                                  
17
 www.globalsecurity.org Last Accessed 23/06/2006 
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seriously undermined its organizational capabilities.18  Jordan is deeply concerned that 
Hamas might seek to expand its activities on the East Bank of the Jordan especially in the 
refugee camps in association with its close ally the IAF. Not only would this undermine 
Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel (1994) but would potentially threaten the pro-Western 
Hashemite monarchy.19 Furthermore, the tradition amongst Palestinians of joining global 
jihadist movements such as al-Qaeda was not new. Amongst the most notable 
Palestinians to do just that was Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and Egyptian Ayman al-
Zawahiri, who became Osama bin Laden’s  spiritual mentors in the 1980s. Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi, mentor and spiritual advisor of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abu 
Anas al-Shami are the most extreme Palestinians within international jihadist circles.20  In 
this phase of Hamas politics we can see the revivalist stage of jihad (see Table 3.1) under 
the banner of the Palestinian liberation movement.  
 
        Table 4.4: Palestinian Authority (PA) Elections 2006 
Party Seats              % 
Hamas 74                 56 
Fatah 45 34 
Others 13 10 
Total 132 100 
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol.13, Issue 05/06/ 2007 
 
                                                  
18
 Ronald R. Macintyre, ‘Jordan’, In International Security and the United States: An Encyclopedia, vol.1, 
(Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 419-21. 
19
 Ibid 
20
 Ibid 
PDF Created with deskPDF PDF Writer - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
                                                                                                                   Chapter-4 
 86
 
After the general election in January 2006 (see Table-4.4) Hamas announced its intention 
to form a national unity government comprising the whole political spectrum of 
Palestinian political organizations with a Hamas majority. As we have seen, Hamas’ 
decision to maintain its jihad against Israel is undermining its political credibility with the 
European Union (EU), which prefers not to antagonize the US, Israel’s close ally.  Hamas 
with a comfortable parliamentary majority (see Table – 4.4) wishes to preserve its 
autonomy to reinforce its ideological commitment towards an Islamic shari’a-type state. 
Its military struggle therefore represents the nature of its jihadist struggle and its 
unwillingness to lose the fighting capabilities of its forces (mujahidin) by integrating 
them with Fatah (i.e. al- Aqsa brigade) forces. A parallel might be seen in the way in 
which the Prophet Muhammad emphasized the loyalty and commitment of his forces 
engaged in the struggle against the Quraysh (Battle of Badr, 624), including the 
subsequent killing of members of a Jewish tribe for betraying him to the Meccans.  
 
Although in theory Hamas has approved the continuation of the ‘struggle’ (e.g. jihad or 
qitl) against the Jewish state the al-Qassam military wing has remained inactive since the 
2006 election. So how might we explain the near civil war conditions in the Gaza Strip 
since the general election in January 2006?  Surely there has been much military activity 
against so-called secularists (PA/Fatah) between 2006 and 2008. It has been virtually 
impossible to set up a government of national unity due to ideological differences 
notwithstanding the fact that  Hamas has decided to apply  Islamist policies in the Gaza 
Strip regardless of the consequences. .   
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Although the Hamas leadership prepared the ground for its election success, most did not 
anticipate the landslide victory which forced Hamas to form the majority government. It 
was inexperienced politically and had no experience in both administrative and technical 
areas. From day one of its inauguration Hamas refused to accept the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people because it was prepared to negotiate with Israel 
and trade parts of Palestine for peace. It was also committed to a non-Islamic (i.e. shari’a 
state). Hence Hamas for practical reasons has invited Fatah and other factions within the 
PLO to join the government, not for the sake of unity and stability as Hamas leaders have 
indicated, but because Hamas is really unable to govern alone. Despite its electoral 
victory and  ability to form its own government, Hamas still requires a transition period 
before it can secure the reins of power  and launch its revolutionary struggle (jihad) for 
the creation of an Islamic state. However, from as strategic standpoint Hamas believes it 
would benefit from strengthening ties with Arab countries, particularly neighbouring 
Jordan and Egypt, which maintain good relations with the West. This would further 
reinforce its legitimacy. Saudi Arabia and Iran also vital elements in Hamas’ politics on 
both a financial and ideological level.  The Arab Gulf States, in particular Qatar, which 
tolerates the Muslim Brotherhood and the TV network al-Jazeera, also provide moral and 
political support for Hamas. Its success in these manoeuvres will be determined by 
Hamas’ leadership ability to moderate to some extent its more unachievable targets in the 
arena of ideology as opposed to realpolitik. Of course be necessary for Hamas to 
coordinate its finances with the above states and Europe, but in return Hamas might have 
to make important concessions which limit its jihadist policy ideals (i.e. shari’a-type 
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state). But is there any indication of this? Is Hamas so blinded by its jihadist policies that 
it remains totally insensitive to the nuances of regional politics? Whilst it has aggressive 
policies towards Israel it is not likely to be top of the aid listing within the Middle East 
and beyond. Indeed jihadist ideology commits Hamas theoretically to a war based on 
‘righteousness’, which may be said to be inconsistent with PLO secular policies  for a 
dual state solution to the Palestine problem, including special provisions for Jerusalem.     
 
4.5 Hamas’ Post-Election Strategy  
 Hamas’ victory in recent Palestinian elections presents in theory a substantial threat to 
the future of the Middle East peace process. The concern over this threat can be seen in 
the urgent summit on 30 January, 2006 in London, where member states of the Quartet 
(2002) (US, EU, UN, Russia) discussed how to deal with the new and unexpected 
situation. The focus of the concerns was that an Islamic ‘terrorist’ organization had won 
democratically the right to rule Palestine (OPTs), while still refusing to recognize the 
state of Israel and/or abandon its armed struggle or renew the peace process. 
 
In his victory speech on 28 January  2006 in Damascus, Khaled Mash’al stressed that 
Hamas will not succumb to international pressures to recognize Israel.: ‘We are adhering 
to the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem, the right of return, the evacuation of 
settlements and the option of armed resistance,’ he said. Addressing Israeli voters ahead 
of the March 2006 Knesset elections, Mash’al said: ‘there will be no peace or security 
amid the Israeli occupation.’21  
 
                                                  
21
 www.aljazeera.com   Last accessed 30/01/2006  
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Nevertheless, Mash’al mentioned that Hamas is a pragmatic organisation, and is aware 
that the PA is based on the foundation of the Oslo Accords (1993). According to him, 
Hamas is willing to fulfill all accords signed by the PA, so long as this does not 
contradict its principles and does not violate the Palestinians’ rights to national self-
determination. He argued that every agreement that is in favor of the Palestinian people 
and does not harm its rights will be acceptable by Hamas. In addition  ‘non-recognition of 
Israel does not mean that no steps will be implemented that will consider the existing 
situation and the circumstances of this level… non-recognition of the occupation does not 
mean that I want to destroy Israel in a flash.’ 22He also noted that Hamas does not intend 
to alter its charter and that the armed struggle against Israel is what brought victory in the 
2006 election. In contrast to the non-recognition of Israel, Mash’al noted that Hamas will 
be willing to negotiate with the US and the EU, however only on the provision that no 
preconditions will be imposed on it. Clearly his position does look like the strategy of the 
Prophet Muhammad at the Truce of Hudaybiyya (c 628): that is jihad could be 
strategically utilized  to achieve maximum political concessions. (see Figure-1, the 
Jihadist Wheel) 
 
In spite of this refusal to recognize Israel, Hamas expressed willingness to the signing of 
a temporary long term peace treaty or Hudna.23 This is very similar to the Treaty of 
Hudaybiyya  a temporary treaty (sulh) lasting up to ten years in 628 between the Prophet 
Muhammad and the Quraysh(6 years after the Hijra). From the strategic point, this treaty 
was extremely important for the Prophet Muhammad’s prophetic mission. In retrospect, 
                                                  
22
 Ibid 
23
 Ibid,   
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The Hudaybiyya treaty24 allowed Muhammad and the Muslims to strengthen their ranks 
without needing to worry about a confrontation with the Quraysh.25 This agreement has 
since been exploited several times by jihadist Muslim organizations that seek to justify 
the annulment of agreements signed with those characterized as ‘enemies.’ (see Figure 1, 
the Jihadist Wheel. 
 
Therefore Hamas’ call for the ‘Hudna’ with Israel is almost an old historic practice 
commonly used by some fundamentalist and militant Islamic organizations to justify 
some of their actions to re-establish and strengthen their power. It helps them without 
being exposed to danger from their adversaries. The ‘Hudna’ is intended to serve the 
step-by-step programmme that Hamas advocates for the liberation of all of Palestine. 
This is evident in Mash’al’s own words: ‘We believe in operating in steps, gradually, and 
realistically. We can achieve our rights step by step and establish our state, on the 
condition that there will be sovereignty.’26 By implementing ‘Hudna’ Hamas will try to 
justify its position in the international community as well as its philosophical stand point 
on Islamic jihad.     
  
We have seen the difficulties encountered by Hamas in terms of   commitment to its 
Charter and its day-to-day ‘pragmatic’ relations with Israel, Fatah, the US and its Arab 
neighbours. But at what level do they conform to jihadist ideals? Jihadist ideals operate at 
                                                  
24
  W. Montgomery, Watt. “al-Hudaybiya,” in B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat, J. Schacht and V. L. Menage (eds), The 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. 3, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), p.539. 
25
 Ibid 
26
 www.aljazeera.com  Last accessed 30/01/2006 
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several levels. Most noticeably in issues relating to security and defence of the 
community, leadership response to external and internal pressures, and on matters  
pertaining to the future of the peace process. The nature of the religious response, as we 
have seen, might be variable in terms of (a) the nature of the ‘struggle’ and (b) the 
strength and/or resilience of the opposition’s  external and internal forces.     
 
Thus the application of the politics of jihad as either the policies of the quasi-state of 
Palestine or jihadist organization   might be expected to evolve or metamorphose 
according to specific empirical (i.e. social, political or economic) circumstances.  Thus 
within an hypothetical scenario in which Hamas is currently the weaker party ( i.e. 
conflict with Israel over the Gaza Strip), the ideology of jihad is  likely to be predictably 
more ad hoc ‘reactionary’ than the outcome of a carefully orchestrated policy of clearly 
defined jihadist goals and objectives towards the realization of a shari’a state.  
 
 Hamas is ideologically engaged in a ‘war of righteousness’ (jihad) - which it describes as 
a ‘just war’ - with the ultimate goal of an Islamic state in Palestine, identified 
symbolically with a wider universal Islamic state. It has managed to survive in the face of 
internal unrest (Fatah/PLO) and pressure from Israel because its jihadist ideology has 
enabled it to adopt flexible options and responses, which have the ability to inspire and 
provide military and humanitarian commitment, sustain suffering and privation and  
provide meaningful futuristic goals for its adherents, if not on earth, then hopefully in 
heaven as a reward for its martyrs who have died in the cause of Palestine. It has 
demonstrated the strength and resilience of its jihadist ideology, like Hizbollah in 
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Lebanon, in the face of massive assaults from its political adversaries which it perceives 
as the ‘forces of evil’.    
 
 But yet when it seems that a zero sum option impacts negatively on Hamas’ ideology, 
critical variations of the Jihadist Wheel or even back to a phase influenced by the 
sentiments of  Greater Jihad where prayer, fasting, individual sacrifice, Da’awa, spiritual 
struggle etc.  become the driving force of its ideology. Indeed it might be argued that an 
increasing threat to Hamas’ perceived legitimacy and identity might trigger oscillations 
of the Jihadist Wheel towards the Greater and Lesser Jihads within a micro and macro 
framework.  
 
Thus the killing of a religious leader (Sheikh Yassin) might trigger off a wave of 
martyrdom associated with suicide bombings and attacks along the borders with Israel 
that might be followed by more intensive religious indoctrination in the mosques and 
schools and universities, which might be followed with more outward commitment to 
socio-economic and humanitarian concerns and considerations in pursuit of aid donors 
for survival but without loss of pride as we have demonstrated. Thus the oscillations of 
the Jihadist Wheel might move from ‘defensive’ to ‘offensive’ orientations as a result of 
external stimuli (an Israeli attack) or a surfeit of internal religiosity deriving from the 
level of ideological motivation of the captive Islamic community. Hamas’ response to 
jihad derives from Quranic and classical concepts of the process, but they have also 
metamorphosed within a conflictual environment in which strategic necessities have 
required the adoptions of pragmatic politics which fail to draw a clear distinction over the 
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justification (i.e. defensive/offensive) for the type of military response to Israeli military 
incursions and/or the nature of Hamas’ military response. In many respects Hamas’ 
approach to jihad mirrors the jihadist response in Iraq to the US military presence since 
2003. In effect the ideological commitment to strategic liberation of territory serves in 
place of a clearly articulated doctrinaire response to Quranic jihad. In effect it is the 
environment which shapes the nature of jihadist response (see Figure 1, the Jihadist 
Wheel).       
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                                                       Chapter – Five 
 
                                                      Conclusion    
 
Throughout Islamic history, jihad has been considered to be the core concept of the 
Islamic perspective in relations between Islam and the rest of the world. The concept 
stimulated different interpretations in classical and modern Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
as well as the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. The term jihad has been used to 
specify different types of external Islamic interstate and socio-cultural relations. The 
changing circumstances surrounding the Muslim world deeply affected the dominant 
interpretations as well as the use of the term to justify political and military actions. Why 
did the concept jihad invade the current political discourse? How can one contribute to 
that debate concerning the meaning of jihad and its consequences for the image of Islam 
and Muslims, as well as their actual situation in the international system? 
 
Defining jihad in an apologetic way that stresses only the dimension of individual self-
discipline as a meaning of the word rooted in Islamic moral teaching does not solve the 
problem nor does it necessarily improve the image of Islam and Muslims. (See Figure-1 
the Jihadist Wheel). It has been the aim of this thesis to demonstrate how the concept of 
jihad has had different interpretations and different uses in the history of Muslim thought 
and politics. The Jihadist Wheel has attempted to demonstrate that jihad can assume 
differing forms and orientations, both macro and micro associated with particular 
circumstances confronting the Islamic state or world historically, at present, and in the 
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future. Rather than differentiating between offensive and defensive forms of jihad, we 
have shown that the jihadist concept can assume multi-various forms deriving from 
differing Qur’anic interpretation within particular traditions and societies.   
 
As we have seen, it was during the dominance of Islamic Civilization and Islamic power, 
the concept of jihad revealed ‘positive’ meaning and was the motive for achieving ‘noble’ 
ends and objectives. During the contemporary period of Islamic decadence (see Chapter 3 
Table 3.1) the concept of jihad has gained a very bad reputation since it has become 
intermingled in Western minds with terrorism and is seen as coming from a militant 
Muslim world that is considered the main threat to Western Civilization. Yet the Islamic 
world is far from being monolithic  and in terms of the application of jihad might be 
expected to interpret the nature of struggle (jihad) with the West (or non-Muslim Asia 
and Africa  ) in a multiplicity of ways, reflecting differing Islamic traditions (Sunni-
Shiite) and nation states of which there are 56  in the Islamic Conference Organization. 
 
In other words, if jihad is an historical concept and process it might be understood in light 
of its historical memory, significance and context. This memory reveals the paradoxes of 
the difference between the doctrine and its application in real life. It also helps to explain 
how the image of Islam and Muslims has been distorted, not only by Western 
understanding, but also by the Muslims themselves. 
 
As we have argued, jihadism theoretically requires that Muslims should fulfill their duties 
to promote the cause of Islam – without limitation (i.e. state borders) or restriction  
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(oppressive government). It is not only an outward act but also an inward one to 
strengthen one’s own self and correct one’s own mistakes. Clearly the exertion of the self 
in all directions—in every effort and act, personal and collective, internal and external – 
is the essence of jihad in the ‘positive’ Islamic sense. This conceptual explanation 
illustrates that jihad is a multi-various concept which does not necessarily involve waging 
a war, but might be associated with intensive religious experience or even simple 
commitment to the basic requirements of Islam. (See Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel) The 
important point of our argument is that jihad as a religious concept  might explode as a 
result of circumstance into varying forms, some of which might be conflictual, others 
passive, but rooted in the Qur’anic belief that ‘struggle’ in the name of God is the essence 
of what it takes to be a committed or fundamentalist Muslim. 
 
 Jihad runs through all aspects of a Muslim life, as it is his other duty in the world to do 
well and prevent harm and evil in every possible way. This can, of course, lead to the use 
of force when peaceful means are not successful. But to equate jihad exclusively with 
waging war is totally fallacious and grossly distorts the application of the concept during 
the classical period of Islamic history and the contemporary Islamic world. In the Arabian 
pre-empire phase (c.622-661) jihad in its military form was rarely applied (at least in an 
offensive way) because of the need to avoid civil war. But with the expansion of empire 
under the Umayyads and Abbasids it was understandable for classical Muslim jurists to 
think of Muslims as a powerful, established society able to wage war against the sources 
of threat to the Dar al-Islam. Equally so, during the phase of decline, jihad in its offensive 
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military form could not be realistically applied against the technogically superior powers 
of Europe. Islamic revival and reassertiveness since the 1980s, including the rise of 
Islamist organizations, has seen a reactivation of the offensive forms of jihad reflected in 
organizations such as Hamas, Hizbollah and al-Qaeda. But their jihad is highly specific, 
ideologically motivated and linked to guerilla style operations influenced by the need for 
revolutionary struggle against forces deemed to be evil and potentially threatening to all 
Muslims. In the West these organizations are often considered to be terrorist. 
 
In Muslim thought, interpretations of jihad are related to other terms such as Dar al- 
Islam (Domain of Islam) or Dar al-Harb (Domain of War). These terms pertain to the 
classical Islamic vision of the nature of international relations. So, the Islamic schools of 
thought and international law differed according to the divergence concerning the basis of 
Muslim external relations with non-Muslims, whether it is a condition of war or peace. 
This divergence could be explained in terms of differences in methodology.    
 
The usual meaning of Islam in Arabic is not “peace” but “submission”. As we have seen 
in Chapter 3, Islam is not necessarily a religion of peace: indeed it is a multifaceted 
process, linked to divine revelation, involving religion, culture and politics. (See Table 
4.2). To understand the connection between Islam and violence, we must understand 
certain facets of the Islamic worldview. One of the most significant facts is that, 
according to Islamic political philosophy, there is no separation between religion and 
state. It shows that jihad in its classical form, while influenced by religious considerations 
(salvation, paradise), was also subject to pragmatic political and historical forces which 
PDF Created with deskPDF PDF Writer - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
                                                                                                                        Chapter-5 
 98
determined its actual application in the lives of Muslims. (See Figure-1 the Jihadist 
Wheel). Thus the ideal classical Islamic state was theocratic in function and organization 
while its foreign policy was shaped by - 
•  its religious perceptions;  
•  the balance of forces operating against it at any one time;   
•   the general process of fragmentation. 
 
The belief that Islam is a theocracy has enormous ramifications and there is no clear 
separation between religion and politics.  Islam is not only a religion it is also a political 
ideology. If in theory the government of the Islamic community is simply Allah’s 
government (i.e. sharia state), then no other governments can be legitimate. However in 
the scheme of things this would be totally impractical and of necessity Islamic 
governments have been obliged to make concessions to non-Muslim governments and 
peoples. (See Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). The legacy of these divisions still impact 
upon the lives of Muslims today and in areas of militancy stimulate violent responses to 
non-Muslims, such as we have seen in the conflict between Hamas and Israel. 
  
Second, Muslims believe themselves to have a ‘manifest destiny’ (i.e. a set of divinely 
inspired religio-political ideals or ideology). In theory the Dar al-Harb must be brought 
under Muslim control by any means and made part of the Dar al-Islam. It is clear that 
those who indulge in religious language strive for ‘effect’ rather than ‘substance’ in terms 
of the politics that might be associated with the setting up of a sharia state. Third, in 
theory the Dar al-Harb by its nature is believed to be at war, which is both spiritual and 
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military. (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel, which demonstrates a constant interaction 
between the two concepts). Because of the need to expand God’s dominion by wars of 
conquest or religious proselytisation ( Da’awa), Islam’s ideology in theory imposes on 
Muslims the duty to ‘fight’ but in different ways (i.e. offensively or defensively, by 
physical means or by prayer and spiritual devotions, see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel). 
Although, in theory, jihad is binding on all Muslims it has been particularly incumbent on 
those on the ‘frontiers’ of the Muslim world, where there was no room for expansion. 
This duty is sanctioned by the Qur’an, and this Qur’anic linkage is the main motivational 
factor for all Muslims. Responses to jihad might also be influenced by socio-economic, 
cultural and political situations. As eminent French sociologist Jacques Ellul notes, ‘Jihad 
is a religious obligation. It forms part of the duties that the believer must fulfill; it is 
Islam’s normal path to expansion.’1 The fourth and final consequence of Islam’s view of 
itself as a theocracy is that in theory all Muslims should not only form one religious 
community but should be subject to one government as well—Allah’s government 
(hakimiyya), a kind of Islamic super-state or  universal caliphate. Of course, the cynic 
might observe that such a belief dwells more in the realm of faith or fantasy than of 
reality.  
 
The fact that Muslims are not united under a single government is due to a variety of 
‘real’ factors including ethno-religious differences, political divisions, economic 
disparities and the process of secularization associated with rapid state modernization. As 
we have seen in Chapter 3, Islam as a religion evolved within a tribal environment that 
                                                  
1
 Hanna E. Kassis, A Concordance of the Qur’an, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 
587-88.  
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was subject to instability and violent rivalry, including challenges to existing authority. 
Sectarian schisms were often the result.  Even in the late classical period the Ottomans 
(Sunnis) and the Persians (Shiites), maintained tense and violent relations for centuries. 
And in the age of nation statehood similar divisions continue to plague the Muslim world. 
 
European domination of the Muslim world was relatively short-lived, ending in the 1960s 
with the   de-colonization that followed World War II. Despite the end of colonialism 
Western and Soviet influence survived in a number of Muslim states (especially Soviet 
Central Asia). This had an enormous effect on the Muslim psyche, which was 
exacerbated by the Cold War (c.1945-91) and the tense balance of power between the 
Western powers and the Soviet bloc.  But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of Cold War matters changed. At first some hailed the event but others pointed to 
new dangers in the world such as the rise of Islamic terrorism leading as some imagined 
to a ‘clash of civilizations’. 2 But statistical evidence suggests only an increase in tension 
and conflict between jihadist organizations and Western European (especially the US) 
states since 1990. As we have argued, Islamic ‘struggle’ (jihad) has frequently derived 
from a perceived threat to Islamic interests or survival (see Table 3.1).  Hamas represents 
a good example of such a response, as it has inherited the legacy of the Palestine problem 
(see Chapter-4). Hamas utilized  jihad as the core of its religio-political struggle against 
Israel. Its para-military activities have included conventional-style warfare (rockets and 
guns), suicide bombing, acts of violence on Israel’s civilian population and monumental 
humanitarian initiatives among destitute Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip. But this 
                                                  
2
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996).    
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has also had the adverse consequence of (a) nullifying diplomatic relations with Israel 
and (b) dividing the Palestinian community in terms of a sacred–secular rift, exacerbated 
as a result of political democracy. As we have seen, jihad has stimulated a heightened 
sense of religio-political awakenings among Palestinians while fracturing the political 
unity of the Palestinian people in their quest for independence and statehood. In theory 
peace with Israel, an unbeliever (kafir) state violates the sentiment of jihad both 
religiously and in terms of history. Indeed the most that might be contemplated from a 
theoretical standpoint may be a short-term ‘truce’ (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel) 
followed by a struggle for jihadist domination of the land, including the holy City of 
Jerusalem (al-Quds), bequeathed to Muslims as wakf (charitable endowment) by the 
Caliph Omar (c.632-44).   
 
Two groups of contemporary Muslims have articulated doctrines of peaceful jihad (see 
Figures 2 and 4).  Fazlur Rahman, argued that jihad had to exist to accomplish Islam’s 
social and political agenda: ‘There is no doubt that the Qur’an wanted Muslims to 
establish a political order on earth for the sake of creating an egalitarian and just moral-
social order. Jihad is the instrument for doing so.’3 Habib Bourguiba described jihad as 
the struggle for economic development in Tunisia, in much the same way as US president 
Lyndon Johnson spoke of a ‘War on Poverty’. In this context, jihad implies peaceful 
action and contains no more ‘violence’ than does the concept of ‘crusade’ in today’s 
English language.4  
 
                                                  
3
 Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an, (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), pp. 63-64. 
4
 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Weiner, 1996), pp. 116-
17. 
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In certain Islamic communities, as we have seen, the Sufi mystical doctrine of Greater 
Jihad still remains alive. Though less influential than Islamism in the political realm, it 
may have more impact on the spiritual life of Muslims. The concept of jihad as a moral 
struggle touches the daily lives of many Muslims. 5 In some cases, like the assassination 
of President Anwar al- Sadat of Egypt (1981), jihad as warfare has had enormous 
consequences but it has never mobilized Muslims en masse or transcended the ethnic and 
political divisions within the Muslim world. Maybe a few Muslim governments and a few 
Muslim scholars (Banna, Qutb, Maududi) have acted in accordance with its doctrine but 
that did not produce anything significant. The doctrine of jihad as warfare in defense of 
the Dar al-Islam did not produce pan-Islamic resistance to Western imperialism during 
World War I. The many movements that arose to resist European expansion (e.g. India, 
Iraq, and Egypt) or occupation were regional or local, tied to a specific leader, regime or 
other specific circumstances. At no time did a jihadist movement arise which united 
Muslims across geographic, sectarian or political differences. Meanwhile jihad against 
colonialism formed part of a programmme of religious reform and renewal which, in 
some areas, had a very significant role in producing virulent inter-communal and intra-
Muslim relations (e.g. India).   
 
More recent declarations of jihad have been equally ineffective. Frequent calls for jihad 
against Israel by Hamas and Al Qaeda against America have not overcome division 
among Israel’s opponents or produced an effective mobilization of their capability 
against Israel. Saddam Hussein’s call for a jihad against the United States, as part of an 
                                                  
5
 Tamara Sonn, Between Qur’an and Crown: The Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Islamic World, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 203. 
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overall effort to Islamize the image of his secular regime in the decade prior to the US 
invasion of Iraq (2003), may have ‘resonated’ among Islamists but  did not affect the 
outcome of the crisis. We can apply the same outcome to the Iranian Supreme Leader 
Ayatullah ‘Ali Khamane’is similar designation of war against U.S. forces as jihad. 
Neither pronouncement had significant political or military results because jihad was 
used as a tool for a vague ideological appeal to all Muslims and as an expression of a 
particular form of religio-political state nationalism. The latter may have had the effect of 
undermining the credibility of the former. 
 
The concept of jihad did not unite Afghan resistance, which remained divided by social, 
political, ethnic and ideological differences.6 After the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan (1989) and the establishment of a new government, jihadists (i.e. mujahidin) 
continued to fight each other until the Taliban seized power (1996).7 Thus while 
contemporary jihadism might have the appeal to mobilize people on specific issues 
(borders, territory, resources)  it generally lacks the ideological appeal to unify and 
sustain commitment  across ethno-religious and national borders or in terms of setting up 
a universal caliphate. The simple fact is that Islam contains many different faces that are 
a product of historical and religious evolution and diversification, which perceive the 
application of jihad, other than in its most basic appeal, in ways which are highly specific 
and related to their (jihadist) ideological goals and objectives. Thus it is theoretically 
possible for an al-Qaeda jihadist to target for execution the leader of Hamas because the 
latter initiated a truce with Israel since coming to power in January 2006.  
                                                  
6
 Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
7
 Oliver Roy, Afghanistan: from Holy War to Civil War, (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995). 
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Muslim’s today can interpret jihad in many different ways (see Appendix-4 the Islamic 
Spectrum) - physical violence generally being at the lower end of preferences. There are, 
however, exceptions which include conflict areas such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The disagreement among Muslims over the interpretation of jihad is genuine and deeply 
rooted in the diversity of Islamic thought. The unmistakable predominance of jihad as 
warfare in Shari’a writing does not necessarily mean that Muslims today must view jihad 
as the jurists did a millennium ago. Classical texts speak only to, and not for, 
contemporary Muslims. A non-Muslim cannot assert that jihad always means violence or 
that all Muslims believe in jihad as warfare. Conversely, the discord over the meaning of 
jihad permits deliberate deception. A Muslim can honestly dismiss jihad as warfare, but 
he cannot deny the existence of this concept. As the editor of the “Diary of a Mujahid” 
writes, ‘some deny it, while others explain it away, yet others frown on it to hide their 
own weakness.’8 
 
The term jihad should cause little confusion, for context almost always indicates what a 
speaker intends. The variant interpretations are so deeply embedded in Islamic 
intellectual traditions that the usages of jihad are to be ambiguous. An advocate of jihad 
as warfare indicates so through his goals. A Sufi uses the term mujahada (fight or battle) 
to specify the Greater Jihad. The late Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba did not 
advocate violence to improve education and development in Tunisia but described his 
actions as jihad. He declared jihad against poverty and to improve his country’s education 
system. In the case of Arafat’s statement about a ‘jihad for Jerusalem’, he intended his 
                                                  
8
 http://www.cair-net.org  Last accessed 12/05/2006. 
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Muslim audience to hear a call to arms while falling back on the peaceful definition to 
allay concerns in Israel and the West. 
 
 Therefore jihad can be used in many different ways by many different people, to achieve 
many different goals and objectives as befitting Muslims of many different nationalities 
and political perspectives (see Figure-1 the Jihadist Wheel).   
 
As we have seen, initially Hamas was not considered to pose a security threat to Israel 
notwithstanding Israel attempts to manipulate moderate Palestinians (Islamists) against 
the PLO.  Hamas emerged as an important movement in the Gaza Strip following Israel’s 
harsh repressive security policies during the first intifada (1987-93), which totally 
debased the Palestinian people. Jihad was therefore an expression of Palestinian anger 
rooted in religious traditions and fortified by an increasingly violent anti-colonial struggle 
against an oppressor state.   
 
Again Syria and Iran have encouraged Hamas’ struggle against Israel, Hamas serving the 
role of regional surrogate in the unfolding conflict. Tehran and Damascus have also 
manipulated Hizbollah in Lebanon as part of the wider regional struggle. Jihad therefore 
might be utilized as an ideological ‘process’ through which major Islamic states direct 
their external struggle against perceived enemies. Similarly, as we have seen, Hamas, 
might also attempt to manipulate major actors (i.e. neighbouring Arab states) and local 
allies (fellow mujahidin organizations) to facilitate its daily  struggle against Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip. In this respect, jihad can be a highly 
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manipulable religio-political process for  the transmission of (a) ideological objectives 
and (b) pragmatic political goals and objectives.   
 
As we have argued jihadist terminology has been reinterpreted and manipulated in the 
course of over fourteen centuries to meet the needs of Muslim empires, states and 
individual Muslims. The process is continuing to evolve and might take many and varied 
forms, under a myriad of different names emphasizing to a greater or lesser degree 
virtues of conflict and struggle in the name of God.  Some Muslim leaders use the term 
jihad in specific critical situations, others more loosely, but mostly in modern times it has 
been used to describe Arab wars against Israel, or against US forces in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. In Bosnia and Kosova jihad might be coloured by anti-Serbian rhetoric 
while in Chechniya anti-Russian feeling would be uppermost. As we have seen, wars 
within the Muslim world (Ottoman and Persia) were also labeled as jihadist. Even 
internal opposition movements that were called jihadist were simply reflections of local 
power politics. As an analytical point of view we have to notice the fine distinction 
between jihad per se and power politics. Sometimes the nature of the overlap of those 
processes is far from being clear, although hypothetically we might assume some form of 
interrelationship. 
 
Finally, as we have seen, jihad might be described as an all-encompassing term which is 
both religious and political; it might serve as liberation ideology or theology, and/or as a 
force for spiritual transformation. It might serve to motivate the individual Muslim in 
prayer as it might serve to motivate the Muslim state in war; it is a multifunctional 
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religio-political process which, as we have seen, might be employed to influence regional 
and international actors in terms of conflict and peace. Above all, it is rooted in Qur’anic 
texts, in the lifestyle and example of the Prophet Muhammad, and has been interpreted by 
generations of Muslims to suit their needs in the course of Islamic history. And, as our 
case study of Hamas has illustrated, jihad can be utilized as an ideological political 
process responsive to the pragmatic needs of a society under occupation, while it might 
also give free and open expression to Islamic states and empires in the full flush of 
political revolution and conquest. 
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                                                    Appendix-1 
 
                                       References from the Qur’an 
 
In the Qur’an, there are 18 Suras (Chapters) with 100 verses which directly describe the 
motives, necessities, objectives and goals of jihad. These chapters and verses are:  
2:154, 2:190-191, 2:193, 2:216, 2:218, 2:244; 3:142, 3:157-158, 3:169, 3:171, 3:195; 
4:71-77, 4:84, 4:95, 4:104; 5:35, 5:54; 
8:15-16, 8:39-41, 8:45-46, 8:55-57, 8:60-62, 8:74-74; 
9:5-6, 9:12-16, 9:20, 9:24, 9:29, 9:36, 9:38-41, 9:44, 9:73, 9:88-89, 9:111, 9:120-123; 
16:101; 22:39-40, 22:58-59, 22:78; 29:6, 29:69; 33:23; 
47:4-7, 47:35; 48:10; 49:15; 57:10, 57:25; 59:2-7; 60:1-2; 61:4, 61:10-14; 66:9; 100:1-5; 
 
A number of verses (Ayats) which sanctions jihad and qitl literally mean fighting and 
killing. Here are some of those verses from the Qur’an. 
 
Qur’an-(9:5): ‘And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists 
wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at 
every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakat, let 
them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful’.1           
       
    Qur’an-(8:65): ‘O Prophet, urge the believers to battle. If there are among you twenty 
[who are] steadfast, they will overcome two hundred. And if there are among you one 
hundred [who are] steadfast, they will overcome a thousand of those who have 
disbelieved because they are a people who do not understand’.2    
                                                  
1
 The Qur’an, Riyadh: Saheeh International, 1997. 
 
2
 Ibid. 
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    Qur’an-(2:216): Fighting has been enjoined [prescribed] upon you while it is hateful 
to you. But perhaps you hate a thing and it is good for you; and perhaps you love a thing 
and it is bad for you. And Allah knows, while you know not.3     
 
   Qur’an-(2:191):  And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from 
wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah is worse than killing. And do not fight them 
at al-Masjid al-Haram until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then kill them. Such 
is the recompense of disbelievers.4  
 
   Qur’an-(2:193):  Fight them until there is no [more] fitnah and [until] religion [i.e., 
worship] is [acknowledged to be] for Allah….5  
 
   Qur’an-(2:194):   … So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way 
that he has assaulted you. …6 
 
   Qur’an-(9:29):    Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who 
do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do 
not adopt the religion of truth [i.e., Islam] from those who were given the scripture- 
[fight] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled.7    
 
  Qur’an-(48:16):    Say to those who remained behind of the Bedouins, “You will be 
called to [face] a people of great military might ; you may fight them, or they will  
submit. So if you obey, Allah will give you a good reward; but if you turn away as you 
turned away before, He will punish you with a painful punishment.”8  
        
  Qur’an-(48:20):   Allah has promised you much booty that you will take [in the future] 
and has hastened for you this [victory] and withheld the hands of people from you – that 
it may be a sign for the believers and [that] He may guide you to a straight path.9     
 
Qur’an-(8:12):   … I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieved, so strike 
[them] upon the necks and strike from them every fingertip.10 
         
   Qur’an-(8: 15):   O you who have believed, when you meet those who disbelieve 
advancing [for battle], do not turn to them your backs [in fight].11  
         
                                                  
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
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   Qur’an-(8:16):    And whoever turns his back to them on such a day, unless swerving 
[as a strategy] for war or joining [another] company, has certainly returned with anger 
[upon him] from Allah, and his refuge is Hell- and wretched is the destination.12   
 
  Qur’an- (8:17):  And you did not kill them, but it was Allah Who killed them…13 
 
 Qur’an-(8:39):    And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion [i.e., 
worship], all of it, is for Allah. …14  
        
   Qur’an-(9:73):    O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be 
harsh upon them. And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the destination.15 
         
Qur’an-(9:111):   Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their 
properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of 
Allah, so they kill and are killed . [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah 
and the Gospel and the Qur’an. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? So rejoice 
in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that which is the great 
attainment.16 
         
    Qur’an-(9:123):    O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the 
disbelievers and let them find in you harshness. And know that Allah is with the righteous 
[duty] (unto Him)17  
        
    Qur’an-(4:95):   Not equal are those believers remaining [at home] – other than the 
disabled – and the mujahideen, [who strive and fight] in the cause of Allah with their 
wealth and their lives. Allah has preferred the mujahideen through their wealth and their 
lives over those who remain [behind], by degrees. And to all [i.e., both] Allah  has 
promised the best [reward]. But Allah has preferred the mujahideen over those who 
remain [behind] with a great reward— 18 
        
   Qur’an-(4:74):    So let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the life of this world 
for the Hereafter. And he who fights in the cause of Allah and is killed or achieves victory 
– We will bestow upon him a great reward.19 
 
                                                  
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
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                                             Appendix-2 
 
                              Jihad: References from the Hadiths 
 
Qur’anic Ayats [Suras (Chapters and Verses)] and numerous Sahi Hadiths of some kind 
were instrumental for Muslims to dedicate their strength and mind to the cause of Islam. 
Fighting for the cause of Allah (Jihad) was sanctioned widely in the Sahi Hadiths. Almost 
one-third of the fourth of nine volumes of Sahi Bukhari Sharif, Islam’s principal 
collection of Hadith, focused on jihad as physical war. There are thousands of Sahi 
Hadiths that simply talk about jihad—the war of Islam. We will examine some of those 
below. 
      
    Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number:35): Prophet Muhammad (sa) narrated, 
“He who is out at war Allah becomes the protector for him. Because, he only joins the 
fight when he puts his solid belief upon Allah and His Apostle. Allah provides wealth and 
much booty (Maal-e-goni-maat) with which he returns home. Or, place him in the 
paradise by making him a Shaheed (martyr).1 
       
   Sahi Bukhari:   (Volume 4, Book 52, Number:46):   Narrated Abu Huraira: I heard 
Allah’s Apostle saying, “ The example of a Mujahid in Allah’s Cause—and Allah knows 
better who really strives in His Cause ---is like a person who fast and prays continuously. 
Allah guarantees that He will admit the Mujahid in His Cause into Paradise if he is  
killed, otherwise He will return him to his home safely with rewards and war booty 
(Maal-e-gani-maat).”2  
      
    Sahi Bukhari:   (Volume 4, Book 52, Number:53):   Narrated Anas bin Malik: The 
Prophet said, “Nobody who dies and finds good from Allah (in the Hereafter) would wish 
to come back to this world even if he were given the whole world and whatever is in it, 
except the martyr who, on seeing the superiority of martyrdom, would like to come back 
to the world and get killed again (in Allah’s Cause).”3  
                                                  
1
 Bukhari Sharif, Bengali Translation by Maulana Muhammad Mustafizur Rahman, Sulemani Printers and 
Publishers, Dhaka, Second edition, 1999,p 102.   
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
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    Sahi Bukhari:    (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 48:):   Narrated Anas: The Prophet said, 
“A single endeavor (of fighting) in Allah’s Cause in the afternoon or in the forenoon is 
better than all the world and whatever is in it. A place in paradise as small as the bow or 
lash of one of you is better than all the world and whatever is in it. And if a Houri from 
Paradise appeared to the people of earth, she would fill the space between Heaven and 
the Earth with the light and pleasant scent and her head cover is better than the world 
and whatever is in it.”4  
 
    Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 44:):   Narrated Abu Huraira: A man 
came to Allah’s Apostle and said, “Instruct me as to such a deed as equals Jihad (in 
reward).” He replied, “I do not find such a deed.” Then He added, “Can you, while the 
Muslim fighter is in the battle-field, enter your mosque to perform prayers without cease 
and fast and never break your fast?” The man said, “But who can do that?” Abu- 
Huraira added, “The Mujahid (i.e. Muslim fighter) is rewarded even for the footsteps of 
his horse while it wanders  about (for grazing) tied to  a long rope.”5  
     
     Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number49:):   Narrated Samura: The Prophet 
said, “Last night two men came to me (in a dream) and made me ascend a tree and then 
admitted me into a better and superior house, better of which I have never seen. One of 
them said, “This house is the house of martyrs.”6  
 
    Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4,Book 52, Number 50:):  Narrated Anas bin Malik: The 
Prophet said, “A single endeavor (of fighting) in Allah’s Cause in the forenoon or in the 
afternoon is better than the world and whatever is in it.”7   
 
    Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4,Book 52, Number 42:):   Narrated Ibn ‘Abbas: Allah’s 
Apostle said, “There is no Hijra (i.e. migration) from Mecca to Medina after the 
Conquest of Mecca, but Jihad and good intention remain; and if you are called (by the 
Muslim ruler) for fighting, go forth immediately.”8  
     
    Sahi Bukhari:  (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 54:):  Narrated Abu Huraira: The 
Prophet said, “By Him in Whose Hands my life is! Were it not for some men amongst the 
believers who dislike to be left behind me and whom I cannot provide with means of 
conveyance, I would certainly never remain behind any Sariya’ (army-unit) setting out in 
Allah’s Cause. By Him in Whose Hands my life is! I would love to be martyred in Allah’s 
                                                  
4
 Ibid 
5
 Ibid 
6
 Ibid 
7
 Ibid 
8
 Ibid 
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Cause and then get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected again 
and then get martyred and then get resurrected again and then get martyred.”9  
    
    Sahi Bukhari:   (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 61:):   Narrated Anas: My uncle Anas bin 
An-Nadir was absent from the Battle of Badr. He said, “ O Allah’s Apostle! I was absent 
from the first battle you fought against the pagans. (By Allah) if Allah gives me a chance 
to fight the pagans, no doubt. Allah will see how (bravely) I will fight.” On the day of 
Uhud when the Muslims turned their backs and fled, he said, “ O Allah! I apologize to 
You for what these (i.e. his companions) have done, and I denounce what these (i.e. 
pagans) have done.” Then he advanced and Sad bin Muadh met him. He said “O Sad bin 
Muadh! By the Lord of An-Nadir, Paradise! I am Smelling its aroma coming from before 
(the mountain of) Uhud, “Later on Sad said, “O Allah’s Apostle! I cannot achieve or do 
what he (i.e. Anas bin An-Nadir) did. We found more than eighty wounds by swords and 
arrows on his body. We found him dead and his was mutilated so badly that none except 
his sister could recognize him by his fingers.”10  
     
    Sahi Bukhari:  (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 63:):   Narrated Al-Bara: A man whose 
face was covered with an iron mask (i.e. clad in armor) came to the Prophet and said, “O 
Allah’s Apostle! Shall I fight or embrace Islam first?” The Prophet said, “Embrace Islam 
first and then fight.” So he embraced Islam, and was martyred. Allah’s Apostle said, A 
Little work, but a great reward. “[ He did very little (after embracing Islam), but he will 
be rewarded in abundance]”11  
      
    Sahi Bukhari: (Volume 4, Book 52, Number 64:):   Narrated Anas bin Malik : Um Ar-
Rubai’bint Al-Bara’, the mother of Hartha bin Suraqa came to the Prophet and said, “O 
Allah’s Prophet! Will you tell me about Hartha?” Hartha has been killed (i.e. martyred) 
on the day of Badr with an arrow thrown by an unidentified person. She added, “If he is 
in Paradise, I will be patient; otherwise, I will weep bitterly for him.” He said, “O 
mother of Hartha ! There are gardens in Paradise and your son got the Firdausal-ala 
(i.e.the best place in Paradise).”12   
 
 
                    
 
                                                  
9
 Ibid 
10
 Ibid 
11
 Ibid 
12
 Ibid 
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                                             Appendix-3   
 
                                    Definition of Terrorism 
 
 
 
          Source: http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm last access,16/09/2005  
                                           
Scholars all over the world including academics, politicians and security experts, all use a variety of  
 
definitions of terrorism. In their book Political Terrorism1, Schmidt and Youngman cited 109 
different definitions of terrorism. From these definitions, the authors isolated the following recurring 
elements, in order of their statistical appearance in the definitions: Violence, force (appeared in 
83.5% of the definitions); political (65%); fear, emphasis on terror (51%); threats (47%); 
psychological effects and anticipated reactions (42.5%); discrepancy between the targets and the 
victims (37.5%); intentional, planned, systematic, organized action (32%); methods of combat, 
strategy, tactics (30.5%).2   
 
                                                  
1
 Alex P. Schmidt and Albert I. Jongman et al., Political Terrorism, Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988, 
p. 5. 
2
 Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
Violent Conflict 
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The question is whether it is at all possible to arrive at an exhaustive and objective definition of 
terrorism, which could constitute an accepted and agreed upon foundation for academic research, as 
well as facilitating operations on an international scale against the perpetrators of terrorist activities. 
So the definition of terrorism states that, ‘terrorism is the international use of or threat to use 
violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims.’3  This 
definition is based on three important elements: 
1. The essence of the activity – the use of, or threat to use, violence. 
2. The aim of the activity is always political in power- mainly, the goal is to attain political 
objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing the social or 
economic policies etc. Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. 
3. The targets of terrorism are always civilians. Thus terrorism is distinguished from the other 
form of political violence such as guerrilla warfare or civil insurrection.  
 
This definition also shows the laws of war and the existing principles of conventional warfare 
between countries and non-conventional warfare between organization and state. Therefore, this 
diagram clearly shows that terrorism is easily distinguishable from any type of military struggle. 
 
  
                                                  
3
 Ibid, p. 14 
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                                                        Appendix- 4 
 
                                              The Islamic Spectrum 
 
 
 
 
Ordinary Muslims: Represent the majority of the population who practice Islam with 
varying degrees of regularity. While not immune to revivalist influences, they favour 
some type of secular government. 
 
Populist Islamists: Represent a form of revivalist folk Islam evidence by regular and 
conspicuous observance of Islamic rules and practices. This area might serve as a 
recruitment source for mainstream and radical Islamist groups. 
 
Social and Spiritual Revivalist: This includes mystic Sufis, many benevolent societies 
and Qur’anic groups. Represent the transformation of popular religious expression into 
organized religious activity in response to existing crisis milieu.  
 
Political Gradualists: Represent the first level of political Islamism, exemplified in the 
Muslim Brotherhood and some conservative ulama whose goal is to establish Islamic 
Islamic World 
Ordinary Muslims Populist Islamist Social / Spiritual Revivalist Populi t l ist 
Political Gradualists  Political 
Activists 
Revolutionary 
Jihadist Revolutionary Jihadist 
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order through conversion and political action. They reject political violence in favour of 
working within the political system. 
 
Political Activists: Represent the confrontationist segment of the Islamist movement, 
often centered on colleges, universities, madrasas and some mosques. They feel a greater 
urgency than the gradualists about the need to establish Islamic order hence their 
compulsion to challenge the state through demonstrations and other acts of public 
defiance. 
 
Revolutionary Jihadists:  Represent the radical core of the Islamic movement 
committed to the overthrow of the regime; they also include smaller underground jihadist 
organizations which have suffered the brunt of state repression.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: I would like to thank Dr Ron Macintyre, Political Science Programme, University of Canterbury,     
 for allowing me to modify and use this portion of his research. 
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